The Failure to Notify Putative Fathers of Adoption Proceedings: Balancing the Adoption Equation by Dapolito, Alexandra R.
Catholic University Law Review 
Volume 42 
Issue 4 Summer 1993 Article 9 
1993 
The Failure to Notify Putative Fathers of Adoption Proceedings: 
Balancing the Adoption Equation 
Alexandra R. Dapolito 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Alexandra R. Dapolito, The Failure to Notify Putative Fathers of Adoption Proceedings: Balancing the 
Adoption Equation, 42 Cath. U. L. Rev. 979 (1993). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol42/iss4/9 
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
THE FAILURE TO NOTIFY PUTATIVE
FATHERS OF ADOPTION PROCEEDINGS:
BALANCING THE ADOPTION
EQUATION
There are over 100,000 adoptions each year in the United States.I Adop-
tion involves the relinquishment of legal rights to a child by the natural par-
ents and a subsequent creation of those rights in the adoptive parents.2 Due
to the permanent results of adoption proceedings, it is essential to balance
carefully the competing rights and interests of the biological parents, the
adoptive parents, and the children.3 Putative fathers pose a great challenge
1. According to a survey by the National Committee For Adoption, Washington, D.C.,
there were 104,088 domestic adoptions in 1986. NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR ADOPTION,
1989 ADOPTION FACTBOOK 60 (1989). Of these, 52,931 were related adoptions (adoptions by
people related to the child), and 51,157 were unrelated adoptions (adoptions by people not
related to the child). Id. Of the unrelated domestic adoptions, 20,064 were arranged by public
agencies, 15,063 by private agencies, and 16,040 privately (usually by attorneys). Id. Approxi-
mately half of the unrelated domestic adoptions were of infants (under two years of age) of all
races and ethnic backgrounds. Id. The remaining were children with physical, mental or
emotional disabilities (infants or older children) and healthy children over two years of age.
Id.
2. The laws applicable to adoption vary extensively from state to state. National Council
for Adoption, Factsheet on Adoption 1 (Washington, D.C., 1991) [hereinafter Factsheet] (un-
published paper on file with the Catholic University Law Review). In most states, the
birthparent or parents "sign a consent to the adoption or a relinquishment of parental rights."
Id. Both can be revoked within a specified time after the child's birth, however this possibility
varies by state. See STANLEY B. MICHELMAN & MEG SCHNEIDER, THE PRIVATE ADOPTION
HANDBOOK 36-56 (1988) (analyzing when consent may be revoked in the various states). At
the same time, the prospective adoptive mother and father file a petition to adopt. Factsheet,
supra, at 1. Court supervision of the adoptive parents and the child lasts from six months to
one year, and after this period, the adoption is considered final. Id. Once the adoption is
finalized, an adopted child is entitled to the same legal rights and privileges in the family as the
biological children. Id.
3. The termination of parental rights "is the most serious of all state interferences be-
tween parent and child" because of the irreversible nature of the proceeding. Elizabeth
Buchanan, The Constitutional Rights of Unwed Fathers Before and After Lehr v. Robertson, 45
OHIO ST. L.J. 313, 316 (1984). When an adoption takes place, both the biological mother's
and biological father's rights to the child are terminated. Id. at 314. Buchanan states that
adoption's "double effect" is that "while a child may have no parents in the eyes of the law, she
can never legally have more than one mother and one father." Id. at 314-15; see also Santosky
v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). In Santosky, the Supreme Court held that "[w]hen the State
initiates a parental rights termination proceeding, it seeks not merely to infringe that funda-
mental liberty interest, but to end it .... 'A parent's interest in the accuracy and justice of the
decision to terminate his or her parental status is, therefore, a commanding one.' " Id. at 759
(quoting Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981)).
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to those responsible for ensuring the proper balance among all parties to an
adoption.4 Only a few decades ago, the consent of a putative father was not
needed to complete an adoption.' However, four significant United States
Supreme Court cases and a number of lower court decisions have duly
broadened the scope and defined the extent of putative fathers' rights in
adoptions.6 These decisions, overriding age-old perceptions that unwed fa-
thers are unfit parents, 7 recognize that unwed fathers are as capable of
parenting as married fathers. The decisions also acknowledge that an unwed
4. Unwed fathers are referred to by the courts as "putative fathers," meaning they are
men "reputed to be" the legal fathers of children. National Council for Adoption, Putative
Fathers' Rights 1 (Washington, D.C., 1992) [hereinafter Fathers' Rights] (unpublished paper
on file with the Catholic University Law Review). This Comment uses the terms "putative
father" and "unwed father" interchangeably, as do the courts and state legislatures.
5. Until the 1972 Supreme Court decision in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972),
unmarried fathers had few rights under the law. In Stanley, the Supreme Court held that an
unmarried father of two children, who had a relationship with the children's mother and the
children for eighteen years, was entitled to the same due process rights as a married father. Id.
at 658; see infra notes 29-45 and accompanying text. Despite the Stanley holding, state stat-
utes often provided that only the consent of the mother was necessary for the adoption of
illegitimate children. See infra note 71.
6. See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 267-68 (1983) (finding that an unwed fa-
ther's failure to take advantage of state procedural avenues to protect his right will destroy the
right); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394 (1979) (holding that a state may not discrimi-
nate against unwed fathers who have openly acknowledged their parental role); Quilloin v.
Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978) (stating that unwed fathers can protect their rights by par-
ticipating and supporting the mother during and following her pregnancy); Stanley, 405 U.S.
at 658 (establishing a due process right that unwed fathers cannot be deprived of their children
without the same procedural protections provided to married fathers); see also In re M.N.M.,
605 A.2d 921, 930 (D.C.) (expressing that an unwed father's due process right is violated by
the failure to notify him of an adoption proceeding), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 636 (1992); Appeal
of H.R., 581 A.2d 1141, 1167 (D.C. 1990) (finding that an adoption agency's interference
resulted in a violation of the unwed father's rights to due process) (appeal after remand, In re
Baby Boy C., 1993 D.C. App. LEXIS 202 (Aug. 19, 1993) (affirming second trial court's grant
of adoption to adoptive parents)); Robert 0. v. Russell K., 604 N.E.2d 99, 105 (N.Y. 1992)
(holding that an unwed father who failed to establish a relationship with his child would be
denied custody); In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239, 246 (Iowa 1992) (awarding the custody of a
two year-old child to the biological father following a flawed adoption proceeding). There was
a great deal of litigation surrounding the B.G.C., or Baby Girl Clausen case. Following the
Iowa Supreme Court's award of custody to the biological father, the potential adoptive parents
moved the proceedings to Michigan in hopes of obtaining a favorable ruling, however, the
Michigan Court held it did not have jurisdiction over the case. In re Clausen, 501 N.W.2d 193
(Mich. App.), aff'd 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich. 1993). The potential adoptive parents then ap-
pealed the custody award to the United States Supreme Court, which denied their request to
review the case. DeBoer v. DeBoer, Nos. A-64, A-65, 1993 U.S. LEXIS 4662 (July 26, 1993)
(declining to hear the case); DeBoer v. DeBoer, Nos. A-64, A-65, 1993 U.S. LEXIS 4665 (July
30, 1993) (dissenting views filed by Justices Blackmun and O'Connor).
7. The Supreme Court has rejected a conception of the unwed father as an intruder,
focused on his own interests rather than those of his child. See, e.g., Caban, 441 U.S. at 390-
93. In Caban, the Supreme Court responded to the premise that if "given the opportunity,
some unwed fathers would prevent the adoption of their illegitimate children," by noting that
impediments to adoption are usually caused by "a natural parental interest shared by both
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father's right to develop a relationship with his child is as important as that
of a married father, thus establishing distinct due process rights for unwed
fathers,8 which include notice to putative fathers of adoption proceedings
and have lead to a growing preference for unwed father custody over that of
an adoptive family.9
Despite the creation of these rights, however, in practice infants are placed
in adoptive homes without notice to or the consent of the unwed father.'°
Adoption agencies are placed in a difficult position when attempting an ex-
haustive search for a putative father.1 ' The process is hindered by the fact
genders alike; it is not a manifestation of any profound difference between the affection and
concern of mothers and fathers for their children." Id. at 391-92.
8. See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651. In Stanley, the Supreme Court recognized that the
private interest "of a man in the children he has sired and raised, undeniably warrants defer-
ence and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection." Id.; see also Lassiter v. De-
partment of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981) ("A parent's interest in the accuracy and
justice of the decision to terminate his or her parental status is ... a commanding one.").
9. See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 658. The Stanley Court's holding determined that the due
process rights of an unwed father are violated if he is deprived of the custody of his children
without notice, a hearing, and proof of his unfitness for parenthood. Id. Thus, the Court
found that an unwed father is entitled to the same procedural protections as married or di-
vorced parents. Id.
In most cases, courts distinguish between custodial fathers, those who have actually lived
with their children at some point, and non-custodial fathers, who never have lived with their
children. For background information on the distinction between custodial and non-custodial
fathers, see Buchanan, supra note 3, at 319-24. Buchanan asserts that "[c]onstitutional protec-
tion for a parent's right to maintain a relationship with his or her child does not derive from
some kind of parental possessory right existing in a vacuum. Rather, the protection is inextri-
cably entwined with the parent's constant responsibility to care for the child." Id. at 319; see
also Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262. In Lehr, the Court termed the non-custodial father's constitution-
ally protected interest to develop a relationship with his child as his "opportunity." Id. Since
Lehr, courts have renamed the unwed father's interest in his child his "opportunity interest."
See Buchanan, supra note 3, at 351-53; see also infra notes 88-91 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the opportunity interest).
10. See infra notes 98-171 and accompanying text. Unwed fathers' rights advocates assert
that this is due, in part, to the fact that the creation of rights for unwed fathers has not elimi-
nated a perception of unwed fathers as "fleeting impregnator[s]." Peter Marks, The Quest of
the Fathers, NEWSDAY, Apr. 1, 1992, at § 2, 56 (quoting Jon Ryan, President of the National
Organization for Birth Fathers and Adoption Reform ("NOBAR")). Ryan asserts that the
negative image of unwed birth fathers is "a deeply ingrained stereotype in our society. When
we hear the word 'parent' we think the word 'mother.'" Id.; see also EVA R. RUBIN, THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE AMERICAN FAMILY 3-8 (1986) (asserting that the Supreme Court,
holding on to an ideological view of the family, has been slow to recognize non-traditional
family structures).
11. See, e.g., Appeal of H.R., 581 A.2d 1141, 1169 (D.C. 1990). The H.R. court held that
"a child placement agency supporting termination of parental rights and approval of a pro-
posed adoption is in a potentially difficult position when acting as agent for the court in offi-
cially notifying the putative father-who may have objections-about the situation." Id. This
quandary has had disastrous results. See id. at 1144-53 (explaining how an adoption agency's
failure to notify a putative father of a pending adoption proceeding led to a seven-year court
battle for custody by the putative father); see also In re M.N.M., 605 A.2d 921, 922-25 (D.C.
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that some mothers may provide inaccurate or incomplete information to the
agency in an effort to avoid the putative father's participation. 2 Private at-
torneys may consciously or unconsciously take steps that avoid the required
involvement of the putative father. 3 Since courts are generally reluctant to
remove a child from an adoptive home once the child is placed, the time to
protect the putative father's due process rights is prior to an adoption place-
ment. 14  Currently, state courts, state legislatures, adoption rights and
fathers' rights groups are searching for a means to balance the need for final-
1992) (describing how an unwed father, deprived of notice of pending adoption proceedings,
commenced a custody battle), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 636 (1992).
12. The National Council for Adoption reports that
[i]n many cases, the putative father is not involved because of actions taken by the
male himself. Sometimes his whereabouts are unknown or he has denied paternity
and involvement in the pregnancy. In other cases, his behavior or lack of support
during the pregnancy discourages the pregnant woman from naming him. Some wo-
men are fearful he may abuse them, their children, or both. Some women are fearful
that the putative father will prevent them from carrying out the adoption plan that
they believe to be in the child's best interest. Some women believe that since the
putative father has provided no support for her or the child during pregnancy, he
should not have the same right as the mother to be involved in decisions about the
child's future. Women who have been victims of rape or incest may understandably
hesitate to involve the perpetrator or perpetrators in their decision-making process.
And women from some cultural and other groups have very serious reasons for not
involving the father.
Fathers' Rights, supra note 4, at 1-2.
13. Interview with Mary Beth Seader, M.S.W., Vice President for Public Policy and Pro-
fessional Practice, National Council for Adoption, in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 13, 1993). This
is generally an unwise activity. See Joseph R. Carrieri & Mary Meyer, Avoiding Pitfalls In
Private Adoptions, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 2, 1990, at 1. Adoption attorney Carrieri reports that be-
cause adoptions are "fraught with legal pitfalls," it is imprudent to "avoid[ I the rights of
putative fathers." Id. at 4. Similarly, Carrieri asserts that it is unwise to "take at face value
the mother's statement that the child's father is unknown." Id. Although an adoption pro-
ceeding "may go more smoothly initially if no father is named, the adoption proceeding may
be in doubt if a father is known but simply not named for convenience sake." Id.
14. This reluctance is due to the overriding best interests of the child standard, which
most states apply in cases involving infants and children. When the best interests standard is
used, the child's existing emotional ties to adoptive parents, siblings, and others are weighed to
make a final custody decision. See Judy E. Nathan, Visitation After Adoption: In the Best
Interests of the Child, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 633 (1984) (discussing the best interests of the child
standard); see also JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
22 (1979). The authors point out that "[a]doption in the early weeks of an infant's life gives
the adoptive parents the biological parents' chance to develop a psychological parent-child
relationship." Id. For these reasons the courts are often reluctant to remove a child once he
or she has been placed in an adoptive home. See, e.g., H.R., 581 A.2d at 1178-83 (wrestling
with the possible detrimental effects that removal from the adoptive home might have on the
child); see also Robert 0. v. Russell K., 604 N.E.2d 99, 105 (N.Y. 1992) (awarding custody to
adoptive father where biological father had established no custodial relationship); contra In re
B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239, 241 (Iowa 1992) (awarding custody of a two-year old child to her
biological father, after she had lived with prospective adoptive parents since birth) (see supra
note 6, outlining related proceedings in the B. G. C. case).
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ity in adoptions with the need for adequate protection of the due process
rights extended to putative fathers.' 5 The fruits of this search have been
disappointing, leaving a trail of frustrated fathers, heartbroken adoptive fam-
ilies, confused children, and hundreds of pages of court reports.' 6
The growing acceptance of non-traditional families and increasing number
of single fathers attempting to exercise their right to become parents' 7 reveal
that it is essential that the unwed father's interest be handled efficiently and
in a determinative manner from the outset of an adoption."8 There are few
legal remedies for a putative father who has lost the opportunity to develop a
relationship with his child because a party to the adoption failed to notify
him of a pending adoption proceeding.' 9 In response, courts are alluding to
a duty on the part of adoption agencies to notify unwed fathers of pending
adoption proceedings.2" The imposition of this duty may be difficult to ap-
15. See, e.g., M.N.M., 605 A.2d at 925. The M.N.M. case highlights the "conflict between
the powerful demand for finality in adoption proceedings... and a serious apparent defect...
namely, the failure to give notice of the pendency of the adoption proceedings to the putative
natural father." Id.; see GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 14, at 35-37 (emphasizing the impor-
tance of finality in adoptions for both the adoptee and the adoptive parents).
16. See H.R., 581 A.2d at 1141, appeal after remand, In re Baby Boy C., 1993 D.C. App.
LEXIS 202 (Aug. 19, 1993) (involving a ten year custody battle); M.N.M., 605 A.2d at 921
(dealing with a four year custody battle); Robert 0., 604 N.E.2d at 99 (involving a four year
custody battle); In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d at 239 (pertaining to a nearly two year custody
battle) (see supra note 6, outlining related proceedings in the B. G. C. case).
17. See Marks, supra note 10, at 52. Marks notes that:
[t]raditionally, it has been birth mothers who have initiated searches for the children
they have given up. In the post-'Kramer vs. Kramer' world, where men are en-
couraged to express a need to nurture, experts say more and more men are asserting
their rights of fatherhood, regardless of their social circumstances.
Id.; see also RUBIN, supra note 10, at 4 (asserting that current facts and figures about Ameri-
can families reveal that in fact, few families correspond with the traditional family configura-
tion, "a model that is perhaps largely mythological"); see also GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 966 (2d. ed. 1991) (pointing out that Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972), "legitim[ized] relationships that do not fit within the 'traditional' family structure");
infra notes 29-45 (discussing the Stanley decision).
18. See Robert S. Rausch, Note, Unwed Fathers and the Adoption Process, 22 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 85, 140 (1980) (concluding that a mother's right to privacy and the "necessity
of minimal disruption of the child's psychological and emotional relationships," among other
factors, require dispositive and prompt handling of the unwed father's claim).
19. See infra notes 173-240 and accompanying text; see also Buchanan, supra note 3, at
377-78. Buchanan notes that once "a decree of adoption is entered, the father may not de-
mand custody because of the harm to the child, but the father should be able to pursue other
remedies for vindication of his constitutional rights." Id. (footnotes omitted). The difficulty in
remedying an unwed father arises from the fact that "[t]he child is a human being and may not
be treated like a piece of property to be awarded to the prevailing party." Id. at 378 n.486.
Still, Buchanan emphasizes that "some means must be devised to deter state actors from de-
priving people of their constitutional rights." Id.
20. See H.R., 581 A.2d at 1167. The H.R. court held that the adoption agency's "role as
a state actor in the adoption process requires that it provide a natural father a minimum
amount of information concerning his procedural rights in an adoption proceeding." Id. The
19931
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ply in practice, however, due to powerful public policies that suggest that to
burden adoption agencies with liability would essentially destroy adoption as
a viable parenting option. 2 t
This Comment focuses on the various manners in which the claims of
putative fathers are handled by the courts. It begins by examining the
Supreme Court's development of the due process rights of putative fathers in
adoption proceedings. Next, this Comment reviews the recent treatment of
putative fathers by several state courts. It then surveys the possible causes of
action available to an unwed father whose right to develop a relationship
with his child is destroyed, and reviews the public policies surrounding
adoption that might frustrate his claim. This Comment then analyzes state
legislative solutions that address and protect the rights of putative fathers.
Finally, this Comment recommends that the best route to a successful bal-
ancing of the rights of putative fathers with the vital state interest in adop-
tions is through state development of statutory protections for putative
fathers. Such protections will concurrently allow those fathers truly desir-
ous of relationships with their children to maximize their ability to protect
their rights, and shield adoptive families and children from unnecessary un-
certainty in adoptions.
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF FATHERS' RIGHTS
The family has been of fundamental legal importance in our society for
decades,22 and the freedom to preserve the relationships between members of
a family is a liberty interest entitled to constitutional protection.23 Because
H.R. court went on to state that "we should not foreclose the possibility of a damages remedy,
however inadequate, for violations of the father's statutory and constitutional rights that may
have caused prejudicial delay." Id. at 1180.
21. See infra notes 241-54 and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 505 (1977). The Moore
Court recognized the significance of the family, in stating that "[olut of choice, necessity, or a
sense of family responsibility, it has been common for close relatives to draw together and
participate in the duties and the satisfactions of a common home." Id. The Court also com-
mented that "[e]specially in times of adversity . . . the broader family has tended to come
together for mutual sustenance and to maintain or rebuild a secure home life." Id.; see also
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496 (1965) (holding that the family unit can find a
safeguard in the Ninth Amendment); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (finding
security for the family in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (holding that the right to marry, organize a home, and
raise children are rights "long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men").
23. See, e.g., May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953) (noting that rights to raise chil-
dren are "[flights far more precious ... than property rights"); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (holding that state intercession in the parent and child bond must receive
constitutional oversight); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399 (holding that the family may find protection
in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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the notion of a traditional family of mother, father, and children, on which
much early law is based, will always fit neatly into the law's definitions,24 a
formal marriage is the greatest protection a man can have for his relation-
ship with his children.25 Where the parents are unwed, however, the scope
of the relationship between father and child is often indistinct, thus subject-
ing the putative father's parental claim to question" more often than that of
the unwed mother.27 Despite the non-traditional role of the unwed father
and the presumed difficulty of dealing with his claim of fatherhood, the
United States Supreme Court eventually recognized that states could not
presumptively treat unwed fathers differently than married fathers.28
A. Overcoming the Presumption of Unfitness
In 1972, the United States Supreme Court established the first procedural
guarantees for unwed fathers in Stanley v. Illinois.29 Peter and Joan Stanley
24. See RUBIN, supra note 10, at 8-9. Rubin finds that a certain ideology of the family has
been endlessly portrayed in Supreme Court opinions. Id. at 8. Rubin states that "[u]nlike
political and economic biases that can be identified and discounted, preferences for particular
family forms touch very deep psychological currents and do not easily lend themselves to
inspection." Id.; see also Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 257 (1983). The Lehr Court ac-
knowledged that "[t]he institution of marriage has played a critical role both in defining the
legal entitlements of family members and in developing the decentralized structure of our dem-
ocratic society." Id. at 256-57. The Court added that "as part of their general overarching
concern for serving the best interests of children, state laws almost universally express an
appropriate preference for the formal family." Id. at 257.
25. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 263. The Lehr Court stated that "[t]he most effective protection of
the putative father's opportunity to develop a relationship with his child is provided by the
laws that authorize formal marriage and govern its consequences. But the availability of that
protection is, of course, dependent on the will of both parents of the child." Id.
26. While perhaps less obvious than the relationship between mother and child, the un-
wed father's relationship to the child can be determined with reasonable certainty. If the
man's paternity of the child is in question, any custody decision will be contingent on a deter-
mination of paternity. See, e.g., In re M.N.M., 605 A.2d 921, 922 n.1 (D.C.), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 636 (1992). In M.N.M., the mother disputed the putative father's paternity and the
results of the proceedings were conditioned on the determination of paternity. Id.; see also In
re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239, 246 (Iowa 1992) (see supra note 6, outlining related proceedings in
the B. G. C. case). In B. G. C., following the lower court's award of custody to the unwed father,
the adoptive parents obtained a stay to keep the child until his paternity was established. Id.;
see also Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392 (1979). The Caban Court held that while the
difficulties associated with "locating and identifying unwed fathers at birth might justify a
legislative distinction between mothers and fathers of newborns, these difficulties need not per-
sist past infancy." Id. (footnote omitted). The challenge that lies in considering the unwed
father's claim does not justify ignoring the unwed father's rights. Id. at 393.
27. Caban, 441 U.S. at 397 (noting that "[t]he mother carries and bears the child, and in
this sense her parental relationship is clear") (Stewart, J., dissenting).
28. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972) (holding that unwed fathers are enti-
tled to the same procedural protections afforded other parents).
29. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
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lived together for eighteen years30 and had three children, but never mar-
ried. 31 Upon Joan Stanley's death, the State immediately removed the chil-
dren from Peter Stanley's custody and placed them in State guardianship.32
Under Illinois law, once the State made a showing that the father was not
married to the mother, he was presumed to be an unfit parent, and the State
could remove the children without a hearing on fitness.33 In contrast, the
State presumed married or divorced fathers, as well as both wed and unwed
mothers to be fit parents, and the State could not take the children of these
parents without notice, a hearing, and proof of unfitness. 34 The State sug-
gested that Peter Stanley petition to adopt his children, 35 or petition for cus-
tody,3 6 neither of which the Supreme Court considered to be appropriate
options.
The Court held that Illinois' "procedure by presumption" could not con-
tinue.37 While the Court acknowledged the State's interest in protecting the
children, 38 the Court held that Illinois could not apply an independent, re-
pugnant standard for an unwed father that essentially ignored his parental
role.39 The Stanley Court acknowledged that no sociological reason existed
to justify a disregard of the unwed father's interest.' In its bold acknowl-
30. Id. at 646. Stanley was a custodial father as opposed to a non-custodial father. See
supra note 9 and accompanying text.
31. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 646-47.
32. Id. at 646
33. Id. at 650.
34. Id. at 658.
35. Id. at 648. The Supreme Court recognized the futility of this option when it stated
that under the Illinois law, "[i]t would be his burden to establish not only that he would be a
suitable parent but also that he would be the most suitable of all who might want custody of
the children." Id.
36. Id. The Court asserted that "[p]assing the obvious issue whether it would be futile or
burdensome for an unmarried father-without funds and already once presumed unfit-to
petition for custody, this suggestion overlooks the fact that legal custody is not parenthood or
adoption." Id.
37. Id. at 647, 658.
38. Id. at 652. The Court recognized that the State's goal in enacting the law effecting the
removal of the children from their father was legitimate: "[T]o protect 'the moral, emotional,
mental, and physical welfare of the minor and the best interests of the community' and to
'strengthen the minor's family ties whenever possible.' " Id. (quoting ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37,
§ 701-2 (1967)). The Court found that removing children from their fathers without a hearing
to determine whether the father was unfit did not further these otherwise legitimate state goals.
Id.
39. Id. at 653-55. The Court pointed out that "the State spites its own articulated goals
when it needlessly separates [the unwed father] from his family." Id. at 653. The Court added
that "nothing in this record indicates that Stanley is or has been a neglectful father who has
not cared for his children." Id. at 655.
40. Id. at 654 n.7 (quoting In re Mark T., 154 N.W.2d 27, 39 (Mich. App. 1967), over-
ruled by In re Hole, 301 N.W.2d 507 (Mich. App. 1980)). The Stanley Court was persuaded
by the In re Mark T case, in which the Michigan Court of Appeals held that there was no
[Vol. 42:979
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edgment of the father's legitimate interest in his children, based in the Equal
Protection"1 and Due Process42 Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Stanley Court ensured that in the future, the State could not deprive unwed
fathers of their children without equivilant procedural protections as pro-
vided to other parents.43
Stanley is interpreted as giving protection to unwed fathers who have de-
veloped "custodial relationships" with their children, as it was the fact that
Stanley's established relationship with his children was being destroyed that
made his case compelling enough to reveal the law's inadequacy. 44 Cases
subsequent to Stanley demonstrated that Stanley was not intended to give all
putative fathers the ability to block an adoption-rather, the father must
have a sincere interest in a relationship with his children.45
B. The Importance of Demonstrating Commitment
Recognizing that not all unwed fathers would be situated like Peter Stan-
ley with an eighteen-year custodial relationship that demonstrated their sig-
nificance in their children's lives, the Supreme Court established in Quilloin
sociological data justifying the assumption that an illegitimate child reared by his
natural father is less likely to receive a proper upbringing than one reared by his
natural father who was at one time married to his mother, or that the stigma of
illegitimacy is so pervasive it requires adoption by strangers and permanent termina-
tion of a subsisting relationship with the child's father.
In re Mark T., 154 N.W.2d at 39.
41. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 649. The Stanley Court held that by denying Stanley a hearing
and extending it to all other parents, the "State denied Stanley the equal protection of the laws
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.
42. Id. at 657. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that
"[n]o State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Supreme Court found that a presumption that
discriminates against and imposes difficulty all unwed fathers affronted the Constitution, and
concluded that due process considerations commanded that Stanley receive a hearing on his
fitness as a parent before the State took his children from him. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 657.
43. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 658; see also RUBIN, supra note 10, at 39. Rubin asserts that
Stanley was a "confusing decision that could have been grounded in either the Due Process or
Equal Protection clauses." Id. at 38-39. Rubin goes on to explain that "in holding as it did,
the Court obscured the basis of the decision, combining due process and equal protection; by
giving unmarried fathers fewer procedural rights than other parents would have had, the state,
the Court held, had denied them equal protection." Id. at 39.
44. Buchanan, supra note 3, at 327. Buchanan states that the Court was clearly aware
that Stanley was not a stranger to his children. Id. The Court also rejected the notion "that
all men are somehow different from women in childrearing abilities and that unwed fathers are
different from married fathers." Id.; see also RUBIN, supra note 10, at 38. Rubin states that
"Stanley . . . marked the end of constitutional indifference to unwed fathers. The decision
shifted the emphasis from the equal treatment of children to the rights of unmarried parents
.... I d.
45. See infra notes 46-96.
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v. Walcott 46 that an unwed, non-custodial father could protect his rights by
participating in the development of the child and supporting the mother dur-
ing her pregnancy and thereafter. 47 In Quilloin, Georgia law provided that
while both living parents' consent to an adoption was required for a child
born of married parents, only the unwed mother's consent was necessary to
accomplish an adoption of a child born to unwed parents.48 Georgia's policy
was based on a preference to have children raised in a traditional family
setting.49
The child in Quilloin was born in 1964, and lived in the custody of the
mother, Ardell Walcott, for his entire life.5" Ardell Walcott and the child's
natural father, Leon Quilloin, never married or lived together, and in Sep-
tember 1967, she married Randall Walcott. In March 1976, with Ardell's
consent, Randall petitioned to adopt the child, and Quilloin's parental rights
were thus terminated under the State's "best interests of the child
standard.,
52
The Supreme Court found it significant that for eleven years, Quilloin
failed to seek actual or legal custody of his child.5" In granting the adoption
by the child's stepfather, the State acknowledged a family unit already in
existence.54 The non-custodial unwed father's claim was not recognized be-
cause he failed to demonstrate a commitment to his child, thus, the unwed
father's right was balanced against the best interests of the child.55 Quilloin
placed non-custodial fathers on notice that they must do more than merely
46. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
47. Id. at 256. The Court held that "the State was not foreclosed from recognizing ...
(the lacking] extent of commitment to the welfare of the child" in rejecting the unwed father's
claim. Id.
48. Id. at 248.
49. Id. at 252. In Quilloin, Georgia asserted that "the strong state policy of rearing chil-
dren in a family setting ... might be thwarted if unwed fathers were required to consent to
adoptions." Id. Georgia's stance was similar to that litigated by Illinois in Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645 (1972). The Quilloin Court stated that "Stanley left unresolved the degree of
protection a State must afford to the rights of an unwed father in a situation ... in which the
countervailing interests are more substantial." Id. at 248; see supra notes 29-45.
50. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 247.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 247, 251. A mother's or father's new spouse will frequently desire to adopt the
children of the first marriage. "[T]he increased divorce and remarriage rate has ... produced
an increased number of children being adopted by their stepparents." Nathan, supra note 14,
at 635 n.19.
53. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 249, 255.
54. Id. at 255. The Court held that "[w]hatever [procedures] might be required in other
situations, we cannot say that the State was required in this situation to find anything more
than that the adoption, and denial of legitimation, were in the 'best interests of the child.' " Id.
55. Id. The Court held that "the result of the adoption in this case is to give full recogni-
tion to a family unit already in existence, a result desired by all concerned, except appellant."
Id.
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object to an adoption-they must hold themselves out to be the father and
make an effort to contribute to the child's welfare.
C. Further Definition of the Right
In Caban v. Mohammed,56 the Supreme Court addressed the rights of the
unwed father under New York's adoption statute, which did not require the
unwed father's consent to an adoption." Caban lived with his two children
and their mother for several years before the mother left with the children
and married Mohammed, after which Caban visited and corresponded with
the children regularly.5 8 When the mother's new husband filed to adopt the
children, Caban received notice,59 but the petition was subsequently granted
over Caban's objection, severing Caban's parental rights in his children.'
New York's statute was based on the withering presumption that unwed
fathers complicated and delayed the adoption process.6 ' Although the un-
wed father could participate in the hearings, the consent of the mother alone
was adequate to grant an adoption, even against the unwed father's will.62
Caban asserted that New York State's distinction between unwed fathers
and other categories of parents in the adoption context offended the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.63 He also claimed that
under Quilloin v. Walcott,64 he was entitled to carry on a parental relation-
ship with his child absent a finding that he was unfit, and thus he desired a
fitness hearing.65
Consistent with prior holdings, the Supreme Court held that to grant an
adoption without the unwed father's consent was gender-based discrimina-
56. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
57. Id. at 385 (setting out the provisions of N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111 (McKinney
1977)).
58. Id. at 382-83.
59. Id. at 385 n.3. Caban's claim was not founded in a Stanley context, because he was
allowed "to participate as a party in the adoption proceedings" and thus was not denied proce-
dural due process. Id.
60. Id. at 383-84.
61. Id. at 391. The New York statute was designed to provide for "the well-being of
illegitimate children." Id. New York asserted "that if unwed fathers' consent were required
before adoption could take place, in many instances the adoption would have to be delayed or
eliminated altogether, because of the unavailability of the natural father," id. at 391, and that
adoptions could "be discouraged if the natural father could prevent the adoption by the mere
withholding of his consent." Id. at 390.
62. Id. at 385-87.
63. Id. at 385.
64. Id. (referring to Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978)); see supra notes 46-55 and
accompanying text.
65. Caban, 441 U.S. at 385.
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tion that violated the Equal Protection Clause.66 While the Court agreed
that states could enact legislation to prevent non-custodial unwed fathers
from blocking adoptions,67 the Court emphasized that the State could not
discriminate against fathers who had openly acknowledged their parental
role.68
Caban emphasized the significance of a putative father's efforts to hold
himself out as the father and defined the state's interest in adoption proceed-
ings.69 Following Caban, it was clear that a state could legislate to protect
the best interests of the child, but it could not discriminate against unwed
fathers who acknowledged their paternity and took an active part in their
children's lives.7°
D. The Beginnings of a Legislative Remedy
In reaction to the new Supreme Court opinions requiring equal treatment
of unwed fathers, many states began amending their adoption laws to pro-
vide for putative father notification or consent in adoption proceedings.7'
66. Id. at 393-94 & n.16. The Court held that "no showing ha[d] been made that the
different treatment afforded unmarried fathers and unmarried mothers under [the statute]
b[ore] a substantial relationship to the proclaimed interest of the State in promoting the adop-
tion of illegitimate children." Id. at 393.
67. Id. at 392-93 n.13. The Court did not "question a State's right to do what New York
has done in [the statute]: provide that fathers who have abandoned their children have no right
to block adoption of those children." Id. at 393 n. 13. However, the Court distinguished those
cases from ones such as Caban's, "where the father has established a substantial relationship
with the child and has admitted his paternity." Id. at 393.
68. Id. at 393-94. In sum, the Court recognized that "[tihe effect of New York's classifi-
cation is to discriminate against unwed fathers even when their identity is known and they
have manifested a significant paternal interest in the child." Id. at 394.
69. Id. at 392. The Court held that "the State's interest in proceeding with adoption cases
can be protected by means that do not draw such an inflexible gender-based distinction as that
made in [the New York statute]." Id.
70. Id. at 394. The Court, in closing, stated that the statute "both excludes some loving
fathers from full participation in the decision whether their children will be adopted and, at the
same time, enables some alienated mothers arbitrarily to cut off the paternal rights of fathers."
Id.
71. RUBIN, supra note 10, at 40. Rubin states that the new recognition of unwed fathers
created a number of new problems, especially where adoption was concerned. If
unwed fathers have rights of any kind, they must be identified and notified of pro-
ceedings in which their rights are in jeopardy. This meant that the states would have
to develop procedures for informing them of impending custody and adoption hear-
ings .... The immediate legislative response to this ... was to limit the notice re-
quirement to fathers who had acknowledged their children, filed notice of intent to
claim paternity, lived with the mother after the birth of the child, or helped support
the child.
Id. Today, almost every state's adoption law provides for some type of participation by the
putative father in the adoption scheme. Some states have a putative father registry. See infra
notes 258-85 and accompanying text. Other states merely require the consent of the putative
father if he can be located or if he has made the court aware of his interest. See ALA. CODE
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The notification method selected by the New York State legislature was a
§ 26-1OA-10(6) (1992) (natural father's consent not required if mother reports his whereabouts
unknown, unless the natural father is otherwise made known to the court); ALASKA STAT.
§ 25.23.040 (1991) (consent of unwed father required if father has legitimated minor under the
laws of the state); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-105(0) (1992) (central adoption registry to
provide notice to those who voluntarily enter); id. § 8-106(A)(1) (both natural parents must
consent); id. § 8-106(C) (court may waive consent requirement if in interest of child); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 9-9-210 (Michie 1987) (putative father registry); CAL. CIV. CODE § 221.20
(West Supp. 1993) (consent of presumed father required unless one parent has been granted
custody and other parent for one year has willfully failed to communicate with and support
child); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-6-105 (1986 & Supp. 1992) (providing for a determination of
paternity); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45(a)-716 (West Supp. 1992) (notice to putative father
if he is known to court); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 908 (Supp. 1992) (providing for consent of
putative father; court may dispense with it if in child's best interest); id. §§ 801-05 (Supp.
1990) (Uniform Parentage Act-allows father to establish paternity); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-
304 (1989) (requiring consent of putative father); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.062 (West 1985 &
Supp. 1993) (requiring consent of natural father and diligent effort to notify him and obtain his
consent); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-2 (Michie 1991 & Supp. 1992) (notice to biological father);
id. § 19-11-9 (putative fathers registry, can be used to enforce obligations of support); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 578-2(d) (1993) (providing for notice to presumed fathers); IDAHO CODE § 16-
1513 (Supp. 1992) (creating registry for claims of paternity); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para.
1515 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992) (notice to putative father); IND. CODE ANN § 31-3-1-6.1
(Burns 1987 & Supp. 1992) (notice of adoption proceedings to named and unnamed putative
fathers); IowA CODE ANN. § 600.11 (West 1981 & Supp. 1992) (no clear provision providing
notice to putative father); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2136 (1983 & Supp. 1992) (providing for
notice to presumed/alleged fathers); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.500 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
1991) (requiring sworn consent of unwed father); LA. CH. CODE ANN. art. 1193 (1993) (re-
quiring consent of biological father); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:400 (West 1992) (putative
fathers registry); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 532-C (West Supp. 1992) (notice to putative
father); MD. FAM. LAW. CODE ANN. § 5-311 (1984 & Supp. 1991) (requiring consent of natu-
ral father); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 4A (West 1987) (providing for consent of
fathers of illegitimate children); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 710.31 (West 1993) (requiring
consent of natural father); id. § 710.33 (father can file a notice of intent to claim paternity);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.261 (West 1992) (illegitimate parent may file notice of intent to
retain parental rights); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-17-5 (1973) (no clear provision for notice to
putative fathers); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 453.040 (Vernon 1986) (consent.of unknown, abandoning
parent not required); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-126 (1991 & Supp. 1992) (putative father may
file notice of intent to claim paternity, timely filing guarantees notice); id. § 40-6-105 (gov-
erning presumptions of paternity); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-104.02 (1988) (consent of unwed
mother alone enough, unless father files notice of intent to claim paternity within five days of
birth); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.070 (Michie 1986) (providing for unwed father to sign
release for adoption); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:5 (1990) (providing for consent of un-
wed father); id. § 170-B:5(a) (providing for notice to fathers claiming paternity who have filed
claims of paternity); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-45 (West 1993) (notice to putative father should
be attempted); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-17 (Michie Supp. 1993) (providing for notification
to putative father); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW. § 11 l(d) (McKinney 1988) (putative father regis-
try); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-6(a)(3) (1981) (providing for notice to putative father of hearing to
determine whether his consent is necessary); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-15-05 (1991) (no clear
provision providing for notice to 'Putative father); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.06 (Ander-
son 1989) (providing for consent of putative father, proceedings must be brought prior to
placement of child); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 55.1 (West 1987) (providing for notice of
intent to claim paternity, paternity registry); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.312 (1991) (providing for
consent of "parents"); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 2503(d) (1991) (providing for putative father's
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"putative father registry." '72 The registry, which provided automatic notice
of adoption proceedings to seven categories of fathers, as well as notice to all
other men who registered, was designed to accommodate both the rights of
putative fathers and the best interest of the children. 73 In Lehr v. Robert-
son, 7 the Supreme Court addressed for the first time the problem of putative
fathers in the context of a state notification scheme."
In Lehr, the natural mother and her new husband petitioned to adopt the
child that she had with Lehr.76 The adoption was granted, considering the
child's best interests, and Lehr's parental rights were terminated.77
Although Lehr never had a custodial relationship with his child, he brought
suit, asserting that his interest in developing a relationship with his child
required due process protection before it could be destroyed, and that the
New York procedures offended the Equal Protection Clause because they
failed to protect his parental interest while protecting those of the mother.78
participation in adoption proceeding); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-26 (1988) (providing for notice
to the natural father); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1734 (Law. Co-op 1985 & Supp. 1992) (right of
unwed father to notice and participation in adoption proceedings); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 25-6-1, 6-1..1 (1992) (father of illegitimate child may participate to legitimize child);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-111 (1991) (notice to putative fathers); id. § 2-209 (putative father
registry); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.03 (West 1986) (both living parents must consent);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-4.6 (1992) (consent of unwed father not required where he does
not establish his right to consent); id. § 30-4.8 (putative father must file notice of paternity);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 435 (1989) (consent of natural father so long as he has acknowledged
paternity); VA. CODE ANN. § 63-1-225 (Michie 1991) (consent of unwed father); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 26.33.160 (West 1986) (provides for consent of alleged father); W. VA. CODE
§ 48-4-3 (1992) (consent of legally-determined father); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.025 (West 1987)
(putative fathers may file declaration of interest in paternal matters affecting children); WYO.
STAT. § 1-22-109 (1988) (notice to putative father if known).
72. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 250-52 n.4 (1983); see infra note 73 (discussing New
York's putative father registry).
73. Id. at 251-52 n.5. The seven categories of fathers entitled to notification under the
New York statute were: 1) those who have been adjudicated to be the father in a New York
court; 2) those who have been adjudicated to be the father in another court; 3) those who file a
notice of intent to claim paternity of the child; 4) those identified as the father on the child's
birth certificate; 5) those who live openly with the child and the child's mother and who hold
themselves out to be the father; 6) those who have been identified as the father by the mother
in a sworn written statement; and 7) those who were married to the child's mother before the
child was six months old. Id.
74. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
75. Id. at 250-51; see also RUBIN, supra note 10, at 46 (noting that "[t]he factual situation
in the Lehr decision lay somewhere between that in Quilloin and that in Caban v.
Mohammed").
76. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 250.
77. Id. at 252-55. Lehr never developed a relationship with his child, who was two years
old when the adoption was granted. Id. at 250. Lehr had lived with the mother prior to the
child's birth, and visited her in the hospital, but he was not listed on the child's birth certificate
as the father, and had never provided financial support for the child or her mother. Id. at 252.
78. Id. at 255; see also RUBIN, supra note 10, at 46; Buchanan, supra note 3, at 314
(discussing the background facts of Lehr). Rubin states although the facts in Lehr were con-
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Under earlier Supreme Court decisions, Lehr had a strong claim for a
violation of due process, but for one complication: he had failed to register
in New York's "putative father registry." 9 Since Lehr was not one of the
"fathers" entitled to automatic notice under the registry, he was responsible
for his own registration-had he so registered, he was guaranteed to receive
notice of any action to terminate his parental rights.80
The Supreme Court upheld the New York statute as a legitimate measure
that balanced the putative father's desire to accept responsibility in his
child's future with the State's desired finality in adoption proceedings.8" The
legislature's intent was to provide unwed fathers with a means to demon-
strate their interest and commitment to their children.82 If an unwed father
was willing to take the steps necessary to register, his right to develop a
relationship with his child would receive protection under the Due Process
Clause."3
Because Lehr did not maintain a custodial, personal, or financial relation-
ship with his child, 4 and because he failed to take advantage of his statutory
right to establish a legal tie,8 5 the Court concluded that Lehr's due process
rights were not violated when the state terminated his parental rights pursu-
tested, it "seem[ed] likely that [Lehr] had tried to make contact with his daughter but had been
rejected by the mother." RUBIN, supra note 10, at 46. Although Lehr had lived with the
mother before the child's birth and was recognized as the father, he met none of the statutory
requirements for fathers entitled to automatic notification under New York's registry. Id.
79. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 250.
80. Id. at 251-52; supra notes 73 & 78 (describing New York's putative father registry).
In addition to notifying seven categories of fathers, the scheme provided that all other men
who voluntarily registered would also be entitled to receive notice of an adoption proceeding.
Lehr, 463 U.S. at 251.
81. Id. at 263-64 & n.20. The Court deferred to the judgment of the State in holding that
"[t]he New York Legislature concluded that a more open-ended notice requirement would
merely complicate the adoption process, threaten the privacy interests of unwed mothers, cre-
ate the risk of unnecessary controversy, and impair the desired finality of adoption decrees."
Id. at 264 (footnote omitted). The Court added that "[rlegardless of whether we would have
done likewise if we were legislators instead of judges, we surely cannot characterize the State's
conclusion as arbitrary." Id.
82. Id. at 263-64 n.20. The Court asserted that through the registry, "the right to receive
notice was completely within [Lehr's] control." Id. at 264. The Court also referred to Caban
v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392 (1979), which emphasized the importance of a father coming
forth to rear his child. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 267. Under the holding of Caban, where the father
does not come forth, the Equal Protection Clause will not prevent "'the State from withhold-
ing from him the privilege of vetoing the adoption.' " Id. (quoting Caban, 441 U.S. at 392).
83. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261; see also id. at 261 n.17 (referring to several law review articles
emphasizing that a putative father who fails to make use of methods provided by the state to
preserve his parental rights will sacrifice constitutional protection).
84. Id. at 262.
85. Id. at 264 ("By mailing a postcard to the putative father registry, he could have guar-
anteed that he would receive notice of any proceedings to adopt [his daughter].").
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ant to the state statutory framework. s6 The Lehr decision focused on the
fact that a biological link between father and child does not alone guarantee
constitutional protection-the putative father must demonstrate a
commitment.
87
The unwed father's unique ability to establish a relationship with his child
through actual support, contact, or by participation in a state legislative
scheme is termed his "opportunity interest.""8 When the biological link be-
tween a fit putative father and his child is paired with the father's demon-
strated commitment to the child, in certain situations the putative father will
gain a preference to custody over non-blood relatives. 89 The Lehr Court
emphasized that it is essential that a non-custodial unwed father with an
untapped interest in cultivating a relationship with his child9° grasp that
interest in a timely manner to protect his rights.9 ' Lehr failed to grasp his
86. Id. at 265. The Court held that "It]he Constitution does not require either a trial
judge or a litigant to give special notice to nonparties who are presumptively capable of assert-
ing and protecting their own rights." Id. (footnote omitted).
87. Id. at 261. The Lehr Court recognized that "the mere existence of a biological link"
between father and child, without custodial responsibilities, would not warrant constitutional
protection. Id. Cases both before and after Lehr have established this view. These cases
illustrate that courts recognize that more than a biological tie is needed to establish a constitu-
tionally-protected relationship with a child. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231-33
(1972) (holding that the importance of the familial relationship stems not only from the blood
relationship, but from emotional connections, the experience of daily association, and the way
of life fostered by the family arrangement); Adoption of Kelsey S., 823 P.2d 1216, 1236 (Cal.
1992) (holding that "[o]nce [a father] knows or reasonably should know of the pregnancy, he
must promptly attempt to assume his parental responsibilities."); In re Raquel Marie X., 559
N.E.2d 418, 424 (N.Y.) (holding that a father's "interest requires both a biological connection
and full parental responsibility; he must both be ... and behave like" a father), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 984 (1990); see also GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, at 16-20 (examining the differences
between biological and psychological parent-child relationships).
88. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262. The Lehr Court held that the biological link "offers the natural
father an opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring."
Id. (emphasis added). Following the Lehr decision, courts and scholars began to refer to the
father's right as his "opportunity interest." See, e.g., Appeal of H.R., 581 A.2d. 1141, 1172-
80 (D.C. 1990) (discussing the "opportunity interest"); In re Baby Girl Eason, 358 S.E.2d 459,
462 (Ga. 1987) (noting that "[u]nwed fathers gain from their biological connection with a child
an opportunity interest to develop a relationship with their children which is constitutionally
protected"). For an expansive discussion of the opportunity interest, see Buchanan, supra note
3, at 351-53.
89. Buchanan, supra note 3, at 373. Buchanan explains that "[i]f the adoption sought is
an adoption by strangers, the father's opportunity to establish a protected relationship must
prevail in the absence of his unfitness." Id.
90. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262; see supra note 88 (discussing the opportunity interest).
91. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262. The Lehr Court held that if the unwed father
grasps that opportunity and accepts some measure of responsibility for the child's
future, he may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child relationship and make uniquely
valuable contributions to the child's development. If he fails to do so, the Federal
Constitution will not automatically compel a State to listen to his opinion of where
the child's best interests lie.
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opportunity interest. 92 Accordingly, the Court held that Lehr's parental
rights were properly terminated.93
The Lehr decision significantly limits the number of situations in which
the state must cooperate with a father who has an opportunity interest and
nothing greater, thus promoting the best interests of the child.94 An unwed
father must promptly assert his opportunity interest and develop a relation-
ship with his child or face the loss of his parental rights.9 5 The unwed fa-
ther's interest receives the benefits of constitutional protection only when he
displays an awareness of his obligation to his child and makes an effort to
build a relationship.96
Id. (footnote omitted).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 267-68.
94. Id. at 262. The best interests of the child standard is often an important factor in
resolving disputes involving putative fathers. See Buchanan, supra note 3, at 365. Buchanan
states that "[tihe father's opportunity interest is of limited duration as a constitutionally signif-
icant interest because of the child's need for early permanence and stability in parental rela-
tionships. That need is a part of the constitutional values to be taken into account in defining a
constitutionally significant interest." Id.; see also In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239, 245 (Iowa
1992) ("The argument that the best interests of the baby are best served by allowing her to stay
with [the potential adoptive parents] is a very alluring argument.") (see supra note 6, outlining
related proceedings in the B.G.C. case); GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, at 35-37 (emphasizing the
need for children to develop secure and stable attachments at an early age); RUBIN, supra note
10, at 47; see infra note 96 (noting Rubin's comment that stable family relationships are a
significant factor).
95. See, e.g., Appeal of H.R., 581 A.2d 1141, 1161 (D.C. 1990) (noting that if an unwed
father's eventual assertion of his opportunity interest is "too late [he will not be] entitled to the
constitutional protection available to a custodial father"); In re Baby Girl Eason, 358 S.E.2d
459, 462 (Ga. 1987) (concluding that the opportunity interest is not indestructible); Buchanan,
supra note 3, at 364. Buchanan asserts that "[the basis for constitutional protection is missing
if the parent seeking it does not take on the parental responsibilities timely. The opportunity is
fleeting. If it is not, or cannot, be grasped in time, it will be lost." Id.
96. Buchanan, supra note 3, at 368. Buchanan elaborates by saying that:
it is only the combination of biology and custodial responsibility that the Constitu-
tion ultimately protects .... If it is officially established that he merely has sought or
is seeking to maintain his biological connection or to visit the child occasionally or to
do anything else short of full assumption of the parental responsibilities that are open
to him, the state may take official notice of his failure to grasp his opportunity...
and need pay no more attention to his interests.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also RUBIN, supra note 10, at 47. Rubin states that "[tihere are a
number of other interests involved in adoption proceedings, including the child's well-being
and the state's interest in placing children in stable, formal families which outweigh the simple
biological relationship." Id. Rubin asserts that the Lehr Court reflects the understanding that
if the state accommodates "fathers who have not supported their children, legitimated them,
married their mothers, . . . or even taken certain minimal steps to acknowledge the relation-
ship .... the Court would uphold formal due process requirements at the expense of a number
of more essential social values." Id.; see also Adoption of Kelsey S., 823 P.2d 1216, 1236 (Cal.
1992) (holding that the "father's conduct before and after... birth must be considered"); In re
Raquel Marie X., 559 N.E.2d 418, 424 (N.Y. 1990) (recognizing that an "unwed father who
has been physically unable to have a full custodial relationship with his child ... [is] entitled to
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II. TRAPPED IN A TANGLED WEB
Following the Supreme Court cases that outline a father's rights and re-
sponsibilities,9 7 it would appear that subsequent disputes involving the rights
of unwed fathers would be quickly resolved. In fact, quite the opposite is
true. The following overview of four recent state cases involving the claims
of unwed fathers demonstrates the myriad of difficulties courts encounter
when considering the claims of putative fathers.
A. Adoption Agency Interference with the Opportunity Interest
In Lehr, the unwed father's own failure to act was fatal to his opportunity
interest.98 The District of Columbia Court of Appeals was confronted with
the case of an unwed father whose opportunity interest was destroyed not by
his own failure, but by that of an intermediary-an adoption agency. 99 In
Appeal of HR., o an unwed father, H.R., was led to believe that the mother
of his child had an abortion, when actually, she had the child and placed him
for adoption. °1 When H.R. received a letter from a District of Columbia
adoption agency, which included consent to adoption forms and stated that
the mother had been working with the agency to arrange an adoption, he
contacted the mother to clarify what had happened. 102 Shortly thereafter,
the child was placed in an adoptive family,'0 3 and although the adoption
agency knew H.R.'s address, it failed to follow up on the consent to adoption
letter."° Additionally, because the adoption agency did not provide the
court with H.R.'s address, H.R. remained unaware that his parental rights
would be terminated if the adoptive family's adoption petition was
granted.10 5 Once he finally learned of the transpired events, however, H.R.
... maximum protection ... so long as he [acts] promptly .... ), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 984
(1990).
97. See supra notes 22-96 and accompanying text.
98. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 264 (1983).
99. HR., 581 A.2d at 1172. The H.R. court held that because state action-a District of
Columbia adoption agency-violated H.R.'s rights to due process, H.R. did not abandon his
opportunity interest. Id.
100. Id. at 1141.
101. Id. at 1143-46. The child's mother, L.C., was a United States citizen who conceived
Baby Boy C. while serving in the Peace Corps in Zaire. Id. at 1143. The father, H.R., was a
citizen of Zaire. Id. Upon learning that she was pregnant the mother returned to the United
States, and the father was later informed by a mutual friend that the mother had an abortion in
Washington, D.C. Id. at 1143-44. Actually, the mother gave birth to a baby boy and relin-
quished her parental rights to a District of Columbia adoption agency. Id. at 1143.
102. Id. at 1145 & n.2.
103. Id. at 1145.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1145 & n.4. District of Columbia law provided that "'due notice of pending
adoption proceedings shall be given to each person whose consent is necessary thereto, imme-
diately upon the filing of a petition [for adoption].'" Id. (quoting D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-
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objected to the adoption and sought custody of the child, claiming that the
adoption agency and the adoptive parents had denied him due process be-
cause they did not inform him of his right to seek custody of the child and
failed to adequately determine his address to serve him with the adoption
petition.106 The H.R. trial court found that the adoption agency's efforts
surpassed the procedural protections established in Lehr, and granted the
adoptive family's petition for adoption."7
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed, however, holding
that H.R. was deprived of the opportunity to assert his parenthood by the
adoption agency,"°8 and that H.R.'s fleeting opportunity interest was de-
stroyed by the adoption agency's interference.' 0 9 The court remanded the
case for a hearing on H.R.'s fitness, and potential placement of the child
with H.R."° The court found H.R.'s case particularly persuasive due to the
fact that the adoption agency was largely responsible for H.R.'s inability to
establish a relationship with his child."'
306(a) (1981)). The adoption agency did not provide the court with H.R.'s address, and subse-
quently failed to make diligent efforts to locate the father. Id. at 1146-50.
106. Id. at 1151.
107. Id. at 1151-52; see Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 263-67 (1983) (discussing these
procedural protections); see also supra notes 71-96 and accompanying text (discussing proce-
dural protections established in Lehr). The trial court in H.R. held that "[e]ven accepting
H.R.'s argument under Lehr that natural fathers possess a so-called 'opportunity interest,' "
H.R. was partially responsible for some delay in developing a relationship with his child by
failing to notify the adoption agency of his changes in address. H.R., 581 A.2d at 1151. Using
the best interests of the child standard, the trial court granted the adoptive family's petition
and H.R. appealed the decision. Id. at 1151-52.
108. Id. at 1165-66. This interference was emphasized by the fact that the agency worker
responsible for Baby Boy C.'s placement with the adoptive family "testified that if H.R. had
come forward before the placement, the agency would have placed the child with him and not
with adoptive parents." Id. at 1166 n.26. The appeals court found that:
by cutting off the possibility of a current parent-child relationship, and then failing to
inform H.R. for more than eighteen months of the legal proceeding which offered
him his only means of ensuring a future relationship with his son, the District of
Columbia- primarily the Barker Foundation as a state actor- deprived H.R. of any
greater opportunity than he asserted to become a parent to his child.
Id. at 1165-66.
109. Id. at 1164. The court held that "state intervention cut off H.R.'s ability to establish
parent-child relations with Baby Boy C." Id.
110. Id. at 1180-82. Upon remand, the trial court was to determine H.R.'s fitness, whether
the child's best interest required his continuing custody with the potential adoptive parents,
and if so, whether H.R. should have visitation rights. Id. at 1192 (Rogers, C.J., concurring).
111. Id. at 1165. For the first time the impact of state action on the father's opportunity to
establish a relationship with his child was weighed. Id. at 1165-66. The case was remanded
for further proceedings. Id. at 1181. On remand the trial court affirmed the grant of the
adoption petition to the 0. family. In re Baby Boy C., 1993 D.C. App. LEXIS 202, *2 (Aug.
19, 1993). On appeal the second trial court's decision was affirmed. Id. at *3.
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A forceful dissent112 agreed that the fitness test must be applied once it
has been determined that an unwed father has grasped his opportunity inter-
est. 113 However, the dissent argued that following a determination of fitness,
the best interests of the child standard should take precedence, 1 14 and that
H.R. did not demonstrate that placement of the child in his custody would
be in the child's best interests.1 15
B. Bending Over Backwards
Two years after the H.R. case, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
faced another action brought by a biological father challenging a final decree
of adoption." 6 In In re M.N.M.,17 the child's unwed father and mother
had a relationship while they were seniors at a St. Louis, Missouri high
school."1 After discovering that she was pregnant, the mother contacted St.
Louis Catholic Charities to discuss adoption. 1 9 When the agency contacted
the unwed father, he opposed the adoption and stated that he wanted to raise
the child.' Following the birth, however, the mother arranged an adoption
with Associated Catholic Charities in Washington, D.C.12 ' The baby was
placed in a pre-adoptive home a few days later, and the mother signed an
affidavit stating that she knew who the father was but that she did not know
where he was and would not identify him.122
112. H.R., 581 A.2d at 1192 (Belson, J., dissenting). Judge Belson asserted that the "court
commits a serious legal error that may have equally serious human consequences by failing to
give effect to" the "finding that the child would be 'devastated' . . . [if] taken away from the
adoptive parents and given to a natural parent." Id. at 1203.
113. Id. at 1204-05.
114. Id. at 1205. The dissent argued that
[a] fit father, including an unwed father who has come forward promptly and under-
taken to act as a father, should presumptively be entitled to custody of his child when
the mother has relinquished her rights and put the child up for adoption, unless it is
demonstrated that the best interests of the child require otherwise.
Id. The dissent noted that the best interests standard "means that the child's interests are
paramount, with a rebuttable presumption that placing the child in the custody of a fit natural
father who has come forward and undertaken to act as a father will ordinarily be in the child's
'best interests.' " Id.
115. Id. Judge Belson argued that it was in Baby Boy C's best interests to remain with his
adoptive family. Id. His wish was eventually granted nearly three years later, when the trial
court, and subsequently the Court of Appeals, affirmed the original trial court's grant of the
adoption petition. In re Baby Boy C., 1993 D.C. App. LEXIS 202, *3 (Aug. 19, 1993).
116. In re M.N.M., 605 A.2d 921 (D.C.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 636 (1992).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 922.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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Although the putative father filed a paternity and custody action in St.
Louis, the adoption process continued in Washington, D.C., where the baby
was placed with adoptive parents, who filed a petition for adoption.' 23 The
adoption agency filed a report in furtherance of the petition, stating that it
had attempted to learn the name of the natural father from the mother, who
would not provide it, and that the adoption should go forward. 124 No fur-
ther effort was made by the adoption agency to identify or locate the father
and the adoption was finalized several months later. 125
The District of Columbia, like many jurisdictions, requires that finalized
adoptions be challenged within one year. 126 The putative father first wrote
123. Id. at 922-23.
124. Id. at 923.
125. Id.
126. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-310 (1989) (requiring that any attempt to challenge a final
adoption decree based on a procedural or jurisdictional defect must be done so within one year
of the decree becoming effective). A large number of states have some type of limitation on
challenges to an adoption. Many provide that after one or two years a final adoption may not
be attacked. Some states provide that an adoption is considered final on entry and will only
allow challenges in cases of fraud or misrepresentation. See ALA. CODE § 26-10A-25(d)
(1992) (one year); ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.140 (1991) (one year); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-
116 (1992) (order of adoption final on entry); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-216 (Michie 1991) (one
year); CAL. CIV. CODE § 228.15 (West Supp. 1993) (five years); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-5-214
(Supp. 1992) (two years); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45(a)-727(c)(4) (West Supp. 1992) (pro-
viding for final decree, but not a statute of limitations); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 918 (1981)
(two years); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-310 (Supp. 1992) (one year); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.182
(West 1985 & Supp. 1993) (one year); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-1 (Michie 1991 & Supp. 1992)
(general adoption statute, no statute of limitations); HAW. REV. STAT. § 578-12 (1992) (one
year); IDAHO CODE § 16-1512 (Supp. 1992) (no statute of limitations, provides for appeals);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 1517 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992) (no statute of limitations, pro-
vides for entry of order of adoption); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-3-1-2 (Bums 1987 & Supp. 1992)
(no statute of limitations, general adoption procedures); IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.14 (West
1981) (no statute of limitations, provides for appeals); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2134 (1983 &
Supp. 1992) (no statute of limitations, provides for hearing and entry of final decree); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.540 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991) (two years); LA. CH. CODE ANN.
art. 1259 (1993) (thirty days to appeal); id. art. 1262 (no annulment except for fraud or du-
ress); id. art. 1263 (action for annulment for fraud or duress must be brought within six
months); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 536 (West 1981 & Supp. 1992) (provides for appeal);
MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-325 (1984 & Supp. 1991) (one year); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 210, § 11 (West 1987) (one year); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.64-65 (West
1993) (twenty days to appeal); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.32 (West 1992) (provides for appeal,
no statute of limitations); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-17-15 (1973) (six months); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 453.140 (Vernon 1986) (one year); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-8-127 (1991 & Supp. 1992) (pro-
vides for appeals, no statute of limitations); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-116 (1988) (two year stat-
ute of limitations); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.180 (Michie 1986) (provides for appeal, no
statute of limitations); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:17 (1990) (one year); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:3-50 (West 1993) (effect of adoption, no statute of limitations); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-
36(K) (Michie Supp. 1993) (one year); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW. § 114 (McKinney 1988) (order
of adoption final); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-21 (1991) (provides for final order within three years
of proceeding); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-15-15 (1991) (one year); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3107.16 (Anderson 1989) (one year); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 58 (West 1987) (one year);
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letters to the District of Columbia Superior Court in an effort to intervene in
the adoption proceeding, and eventually filed a pro se motion after the stat-
ute of limitations had expired.' 27 Subsequently, the trial judge concluded
that the putative father's motion to intervene was barred by the statute of
limitations.1 28 The court of appeals reversed, holding that the unwed father
had a constitutionally protected right to fair notice of, and opportunity to
participate in, the adoption proceedings because he grasped his opportunity
interest in a timely manner.' 29 The court also held that because the father
was denied his constitutional right to notice and opportunity to be heard, the
adoption would not become final until he was given those rights.' 3 ° The
court was troubled, however, recognizing that by the end of the proceedings,
the child had lived with her adoptive family for over four years.' The
court's narrow holding was that once paternity was established, the unwed
father must have the opportunity to offer his opinion of what he believed was
in the child's best interests, despite the passing of the one year statute of
limitations.' 3 2 Once again, a zealous dissent vehemently opposed the deci-
sion, arguing that the purpose of the strict one-year statute of limitations and
other procedural requirements surrounding adoption is to ensure the finality
OR. REV. STAT. § 109.381 (1991) (one year); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 2902 (1991) (vacation
of adoption proceeding); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-14 (1988) (provides for final decree, no stat-
ute of limitations); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1800 (Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1992) (one year);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-6-13 (1992) (provides for adoption decree, no statute of limi-
tations; TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-124 (1991) (provides for adoption decree, no statute of
limitations); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.12 (West 1986) (two years); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-
30-9 (1992) (provides for adoption decree, no statute of limitations); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 447 (1989) (provides for final adoption, no statute of limitations); VA. CODE ANN. § 63-1-
237 (Michie 1991) (six month statute of limitations); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.33.260
(West 1986) (provides for adoption decree, no statute of limitations); W. VA. CODE § 48-4-12
(1992) (provides for adoption decree, no statute of limitations); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.911
(West 1987) (21 days to appeal adoption); WYO. STAT. § 1-22-112 (1988) (provides for final
decree, no statute of limitations). These statutes of limitations embody the need for certainty
and finality in adoption proceedings. Amicus Brief for the National Council for Adoption at 1,
In re M.N.M., 605 A.2d 921 (D.C.) 90-1395, cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 636 (1992).
127. M.N.M., 605 A.2d at 923-24.
128. Id. at 924.
129. Id. at 927-30.
130. Id. at 930. The unwed father's paternity was in question, however, and the court
noted that his paternity would have to be established prior to his being granted due process
rights. Id.
131. Id. The court cautioned that "many factors must be evaluated in deciding what dis-
position is best for this child, including the fact that he [sic] has lived with the adoptive parents
for more than four years." Id.
132. Id. The M.N.M. court ruled that "[w]e hold only that, assuming paternity, appellant
must be accorded the opportunity to voice 'his opinion of where the child's best interest lie
.... .(quoting Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983)).
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of adoptions and the best interests of the child, neither of which should be
compromised by the untimely objection of an unwed father. 133
The M.N.M. decision demonstrates how courts will bend over backwards
to accommodate the claim of the unwed father, even going so far as to make
an exception to a "hard and fast" one-year statute of limitations, violating
"an unequivocal public policy.",1 34 The M.N.M. decision, however, was not
the last instance in which a court extended itself to avoid closing off an un-
wed father's claim.
C. The Unbridled Discretion of a Solomon
One of the most controversial adoption cases to date recently reached the
high court of two states and of the United States. In In re B.G.C.,135 an
unwed mother, Cara, placed her child for adoption immediately after
birth. 136 Cara signed the release of parental rights form, named the father of
the baby as her current boyfriend, Scott, and obtained Scott's signature on
the release. 137 Scott and Cara then waived notice of the termination hearing,
releasing custody of the child to the potential adoptive parents, Jan and
Roberta DeBoer. 1 3' A few weeks later, Cara moved to set aside the termina-
133. Id. at 933 (Gallagher, J., dissenting). Judge Gallagher argued that the statute of limi-
tations exists "because after a final decree of adoption, one would be seeking to remove a child
from an established family." Id. Judge Gallagher asserted that "the child has been in the
family since she was two or three weeks old and is now nearing five. It is entirely reasonable
that this statute of limitations, which comes into play only after a final decree, would be tightly
written. And I suggest the plain language should be construed the same way." Id.
134. Id. Judge Gallagher asserts that:
"[a]s a matter of public policy, in the interest of the stability of human affairs in
relation to a permanent parent-child relationship, the legislature specifically provided
for a hard and fast cut-off date of one year after the final decree of adoption. A
statute of limitations is 'a public policy about the privilege to litigate.'"
Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314
(1945)).
135. In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239 (Iowa 1992) (see supra note 6, outlining related pro-
ceedings in the B.G.C. case).
136. Id. at 240-41; see also Isabel Wilkerson, Adoption Battle Pits Couple Versus Couple,
HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Jan. 3, 1993, at A2 (explaining that Cara's maiden name was Clausen,
and that she later married Daniel Schmidt, the infant's actual father). The child was referred
to in court papers as Baby Girl Clausen, or "B.G.C."
137. In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d at 241.
138. Id. The prospective adoptive parents, the DeBoers, were from Michigan, and eventu-
ally returned to Michigan with the child. Mona Charen, When the Courts Work to Split Up a
Happy Family, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Dec. 15, 1992, at A23; see also Nancy Gibbs, In Whose
Best Interest?, TIME, July 19, 1993, at 45 [hereinafter Whose Best Interest?] (outlining the
lengthy history of the DeBoer case in the courts). The adoption of a child born in one state by
parents from another state is called an "interstate adoption." MICHELMAN & SCHNEIDER,
supra note 2, at 21. Michelman and Schneider explain that although adoptions within the
same state are simpler, an "Interstate Compact" governs adoptions between states. Id. Inter-
state adoptions often require the adoptive parents to spend time in the state where the child
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tion, claiming her release was defective because another man, Daniel, was
the real father.139 Cara's motion was denied, but as the DeBoer's adoption
petition moved forward, Daniel intervened in the adoption proceeding to
assert his parental rights, which had never been terminated.1" Daniel and
Cara subsequently married and began pursuing the child's return
together. 4 1
The Iowa District Court for Linn County found that Daniel was the
child's father, that he had not released his parental rights or abandoned the
child, and thus it denied the adoption and ordered that the DeBoer's surren-
der the child to Daniel.' 42 Subsequently, the DeBoers obtained a stay al-
lowing them to keep the child pending their appeal to the Court of Appeals
and the Iowa Supreme Court. 143 The Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed the
district court and ordered that custody of the baby be transferred to Daniel,
also finding that Daniel was the father, that he had not abandoned the baby,
and that the adoption proceeding was therefore flawed.44 The court recog-
nized that while both sides presented a sympathetic case, it did not have the
"unbridled discretion of a Solomon"1 45 to determine which home and which
set of parents might be better for the child. 146
A strong dissent faulted the majority's decision, contending that it allowed
the unwed father the opportunity to jeopardize an established relation-
was born until a period during which parental consent can be revoked has passed. Id. at 21-
22. Interstate adoptions are also governed by the laws of the state in which the adoptive family
lives and by those of the state in which the child is born. Id.
139. B.G.C, 496 N.W.2d at 241.
140. Id.
141. Whose Best Interest?, supra note 138, at 47.
142. B.G.C, 496 N.W.2d at 241.
143. Id.
144. Id. The child was 17 months old at the time of the order, and the only parents she
had ever known were her potential adoptive parents, the DeBoers. In its decision, the Iowa
Supreme Court cited the district court which noted that " '[w]hile cognizant of the heartache
which this decision will ultimately cause, this court is presented with no other option than that
dictated by the law in this state. Purely equitable principles cannot be substituted for well-
established principles of law.' " Id. at 246 (quoting the district court's opinion).
145. Id. at 241. The court went on to say that "[o]urs is a system of law, and adoptions are
solely creatures of statute." Id. The court did not fault Daniel for his delayed involvement in
the proceeding, and found it "totally unrealistic" to expect that Daniel could have protected
his parental rights as soon as the pregnancy was known, as "it would require a potential father
to become involved in the pregnancy on the mere speculation that he might be the father ......
Id. at n.1.
146. Id. at 241 (citing In re Burney, 259 N.W.2d 322, 324 (Iowa 1977)). The court pointed
out that its resolution of the case did not invalidate a finalized adoption decree. Id. Part of the
flaw in the potential adoption was that Cara was given the adoption papers prior to the 72-
hour waiting period mandated by Iowa law. Id. at 242-43; see IOWA CODE § 600A.4(4),
600A.4(d) (1981) (mandating a 72-hour waiting period). The court added that " 'courts are
not free to take children from their parents simply by deciding that another home offers more
advantages.' " Id. at 241 (quoting Burney, 259 N.W.2d at 324).
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ship.'47 The dissent asserted that since the father knew of the situation and
did nothing to protect his rights at the time of birth, he thereby forfeited his
rights by his indifference to the fate of the mother and child. 4 In an almost
unprecedented action, the DeBoers filed a petition in their home state of
Michigan under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act,149 hoping that
the Michigan courts would modify the Iowa decision and rule using the best
interest of the child standard. 5 ° Although the Washtenaw County Circuit
Court in Michigan ruled that it was in the child's best interest to remain
with the DeBoers,' 5' the Schmidts appealed the circuit court ruling to the
Michigan Court of Appeals,152 which ruled that the circuit court lacked ju-
risdiction to intervene in the case, and held that the Iowa order returning
custody of the child to Daniel must be enforced. 15
3
On July 2, 1993, the Michigan Supreme Court confirmed that the child
must be returned to the biological parents pursuant to the Iowa ruling.' 54
An ardent dissent pointed out that the court had lost sight of the fact that it
was ruling on the outcome of a child's life.'55
147. Id. at 247 (Snell, J., dissenting). The dissent stated that "[tihe specter of newly named
genetic fathers, upsetting adoptions, perhaps years later, is an unconscionable result." Id. The
dissent further stated that "[sluch a consequence is "not driven by the language of our statutes,
due process concerns or the facts of this case." Id.
148. Id.
149. MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 600.651-673 (1981 & Supp. 1993-94).
150. In re Clausen, 501 N.W.2d 193, 195 (Mich. App. 1993).
151. Id. at 196.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 198.
154. In re Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649, 668 (Mich. 1933). The Michigan Supreme Court,
although sensitive to the emotional implications of its decision, stated:
[t]hese cases have been litigated through fervent emotional appeals, with counsel and
the adult parties pleading that their only interests are to do what is best for the child,
who is herself blameless for this protracted litigation and the grief that it has
caused .... It is now time for the adults to move beyond saying that their only
concern is the welfare of the child and to put those words into action by assuring that
the transfer of custody is accomplished promptly with minimum disruption of the life
of the child.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also Edward Walsh, Two Parents Too Many for a Little Girl, WASH.
POST, June 4, 1993, at Cl (describing the proceeding before the Michigan Supreme Court as
"orderly" but in reality "a war of the most savage kind, a war for the body, mind and affec-
tions of a little girl"); Whose Best Interest?, supra note 138, at 47; Sam H. Verhovek, Michigan
Court Says Adopted Girl Must Be Sent to Biological Parents, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1993, at A6.
155. In re Clausen, 502 N.W.2d at 668-69 (Levin, J., dissenting). Judge Levin asserted that
he would agree with the majority
if the DeBoers had gone to Iowa, purchased a carload of hay from Cara Clausen, and
then found themselves in litigation in Iowa with Daniel Schmidt, who also claimed
an interest in the hay .... But this is not a lawsuit concerning the ownership, the
legal title, to a bale of hay .... There is a C, the child, "a feeling, vulnerable, and
[about to be] sorely put upon little human being .... "
Id. (quoting Lemley v. Barr, 343 S.E.2d 101, 104 (W. Va. 1986)).
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The DeBoers applied to Justice Stevens, in his capacity as Circuit Justice
for the Sixth Circuit, asking for a stay of the Iowa and Michigan court rul-
ings requiring them to return the child to the Schmidts.'5 6 Justice Stevens
found that the Michigan courts properly ruled that they had no jurisdiction
over the case, and denied the application for a stay. 15 7 On August 2, 1993,
the child was transported from the DeBoer's home in Michigan, to the
Schmidts, who now retain custody of the child.' A forceful dissent from
Justices Blackmun and O'Connor indicated that the Court's decision not to
hear the case troubled the Justices.159
The emotional B. . C. case pitted biological parents against adoptive par-
ents, and questioned the definition of "parent."' ' ° In doing so, the courts of
two states compromised the interests of the child in an extraordinary accom-
modation of the biological father.'
6 1
156. DeBoer v. DeBoer, Nos. A-64, A-65, 1993 U.S. LEXIS 4662 (July 26, 1993).
157. Id. at *3; see also Joan Biskupic, Child's Return Is Affirmed at High Court, WASH.
POST, July 27, 1993, at Al, A5.
158. Jerry Dubrowski, Couple Returns Toddler to Biological Parents, REUTERS, August 2,
1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, WIRES File (noting that "Jan and Roberta DeBoer
turned their adopted child Jessica, screaming and kicking, over to her biological parents...
ending an agonising [sic], two-year legal battle ....").
159. DeBoer v. DeBoer, Nos. A-64, A-65, 1993 U.S. LEXIS 4665 (July 30, 1993) (Black-
mun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice O'Connor, noted that:
[w]hile I am not sure where the ultimate legalities or equities lie, I am sure that I am
not willing to wash my hands of this case at this stage, with the personal vulnerability
of the child so much at risk, and with the [state courts] in fundamental disagreement
over the duty and authority of state courts to consider the best interests of a child
when rendering a custody decree.
Id. at *2-*3.
160. Isabel Wilkerson, Michigan Couple is Ordered to Return Girl, 2, to Biological Parents,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1993, at A17. The B.G.C case received extensive media attention as it
proceeded through the courts. See, e.g., Charen, supra note 138, at A23 ("This amounts to a
legal kidnapping."); Anna Quindlen, Whose Best Interests?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1992, at A23
(adoptive parents "hope to find a judge willing to combine humanity, discretion and statute" to
keep the child in her adoptive home); Wilkerson, supra note 136, at A2 (highlighting the
tension between biological and adoptive parents).
161. This tension between the biological connection and the concept of "family" was re-
vealed even in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). See supra notes 29-45 and accompany-
ing text; see also RUBIN, supra note 10, at 43. Rubin points out that:
Stanley ... revealed a conflict between two tenets of the family ideology. The family
ideology recognizes the importance of blood ties and accepts the proposition that
parents should be held responsible for their reproductive activities .... However,
conflict can arise between this proposition and the principle that children should be
raised in a family environment and that the integration of a child into a working
family unit is the proper goal of public policy.
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D. A Demand For Prompt Action
While the Supreme Courts of Iowa and Michigan emphasized fathers'
rights over the best interest of the child standard, the New York Court of
Appeals used the same standard to hold that a man who did not know he
had fathered a son until 18 months after the child's birth could not overturn
the child's adoption.'6 2 In Robert 0. v. Russell K, the court unanimously
ruled that the unwed father lost his right to consent to the adoption of his
child where he failed to establish a relationship with his child, even though
he was unaware of the child's existence.' 63 The Robert 0. case involved one
of the most significant and difficult issues in accommodating the putative
father in adoptions-how the father can protect his opportunity interest
when he does not know that he is a parent."'
Robert 0. and Carol A.'s engagement ended following difficulties;
although Carol was pregnant at the time, she did not tell Robert.'6 Instead,
Carol arranged for her friends, Russell K. and his wife, to adopt the baby. '
66
Following the child's birth and placement Robert and Carol married, Carol
told Robert of the child, and Robert sought to vacate the adoption.' 67
The New York Court of Appeals ruled that the child's welfare, the rights
of the adoptive parents, the attachments developed in that family, and the
state's interest in maintaining the integrity of adoptions must take prece-
dence over the biological father's interest in his child. 6 ' The court found
that Robert O.'s only connection to his child during the first months of his
child's life was biological, and rejected his assertion that had he known of
the child's existence, he would have accepted more responsibility.' 69 In the
court's view, Robert 0. failed to assert his rights in a timely manner, and
162. Robert 0. v. Russell K., 604 N.E.2d 99, 105 (N.Y. 1992) (holding that the "opportu-
nity becomes protected only if grasped").
163. Id. at 100-01.
164. Id. at 101. Carol, the mother, was never asked by the adoption court to name the
father, and she signed a statement that indicated that there was no one entitled to notice under
the state's domestic relations law. Id.
165. Id. at 100.
166. Id. The adoption was finalized seven months after the birth. Id. at 100-01.
167. Id. at 101. Robert immediately filed with New York's Putative Father Registry, reim-
bursed Carol for her medical expenses, and initiated a proceeding to vacate the adoption. Id.
This was nearly 18 months after the birth and placement. Id.
168. Id. at 103-04. The court held that
[t]he competing interests at stake in an adoption-and the complications presented
by petitioner's position-are clearly illustrated here: nearly a year and a half after the
baby went to live with the adoptive parents, and more than 10 months after they
were told by the court that the baby was legally theirs, petitioner sought to rearrange
those lives by initiating his present legal action.
Id. at 104 (footnote omitted).
169. Id. at 103-04. The court held that "[t]o conclude that petitioner acted promptly once
he became aware of the child is to fundamentally misconstrue whose timetable is relevant.
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thus the state could deny his right to consent to the adoption of his child.' 7°
Unlike the decision in B. G. C., the Robert 0. case illustrates that the compet-
ing interests in adoption must not be jeopardized by an unwed father who
attempts to belatedly assert his parental rights.' 7 '
III. WHAT Is A FATHER To Do?
The dilemma that exists in the state courts centers on how to handle ap-
propriately an unwed father's claim, particularly if the claim is delayed, 72
interfered with, 17 or masked by misrepresentation. 74  Adoption agencies
are placed in a difficult position when they are obligated to serve as in-
termediaries. " While the Supreme Court has established due process rights
for the putative father,' 76 it is generally accepted that those rights are fleet-
ing.17 7 If the unwed father does not act immediately to protect his right,
many courts will rule against a transfer of custody once a child has been
placed with an adoptive family.'17  Once a final decree of adoption is en-
Promptness is measured in terms of the baby's life not by the onset of the father's awareness."
Id. at 103.
170. Id. at 103-04. The court held that "[tihe demand for prompt action by the father at
the child's birth is neither arbitrary nor punitive, but instead a logical and necessary outgrowth
of the State's legitimate interest in the child's need for early permanence and stability." Id.
(emphasis added).
171. Id. at 103. The court struck a balance, noting that "[s]tates have a legitimate concern
for prompt and certain adoption procedures and their determination of the rights of unwed
fathers need not be blind" to the importance of creating adoption procedures which ensure the
best interests of the child and "protect[ ] the rights of interested third parties like adoptive
parents." Id.; see also Dennis Hevesi, Court Denies Father's Late Request to Overturn Adop-
tion, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1992, at B6 (reporting that the decision will "avoid creating havoc"
in adoptions).
172. See In re M.N.M., 605 A.2d 921, 924 (D.C.), cert. denied, 113 S, Ct. 636 (1992)
(paternity claim filed one month and twenty-four days after statute of limitations expired);
Robert 0., 604 N.E.2d at 103 (paternity claim filed eighteen months after birth and
placement).
173. Appeal of H.R., 581 A.2d 1141, 1166 (D.C. 1990) (adoption agency violated unwed
father's procedural rights).
174. In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239, 241 (Iowa 1992) (unwed mother intentionally listed
wrong father on consent to adoption forms) (see supra note 6, outlining related proceedings in
the B. G. C. case).
175. See H.R., 581 A.2d at 1169 (noting that an agency supporting adoption is in a difficult
position when it must notify the putative father of the proposed adoption, recognizing that he
may object to the adoption).
176. See supra notes 29-96 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 88-96 and accompanying text.
178. See, e.g., H.R., 581 A.2d at 1180. Although H.R.'s "fitness" as a parent was dis-
cussed, the best interests of the child standard eventually prevented a transfer of custody. In re
Baby Boy C., 1993 D.C. App. LEXIS 202, *3 (Aug. 19, 1993). See also Robert 0. v. Russell
K., 604 N.E.2d 99, 103 (N.Y. 1992) (precluding a transfer of custody in the child's interest);
contra In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d at 241-46 (rejecting the best interest of the child standard);
see supra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing the best interests of the child standard).
[Vol. 42:9791006
1993] Balancing The Adoption Equation 1007
tered, despite a father's efforts to preserve his opportunity interest, 179 it is
nearly certain that he will not be given custody.' 8°
If custody is not a viable option in most cases, what is a father, deprived of
his right, to do? In H.R., the court alludes to the possibility of bringing a
damages claim against the adoption agency where the agency causes the loss
of the father's opportunity interest. 8 ' While few states have directly ad-
dressed the validity of such a cause of action against an adoption agency,
some state courts have attempted to analogize the action to existing causes of
action against the state and its social workers.'8 2 Although several options
are available that permit an unwed father to take action against an adoption
agency to protect his rights, such actions often fail.'8 3
A. Possible Causes of Action Against an Adoption Agency
1. Violation of Due Process
The termination of parental rights procedure merits constitutional
protection.' 84 An unwed father may bring an action under 42 U.S.C.
179. See, e.g., H.R., 581 A.2d at 1145-51 (letters, calls, petitions filed by putative father);
In re M.N.M., 605 A.2d 921, 923-24 (D.C.) (letters to court, petitions filed by putative father),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 636 (1992); Robert 0., 604 N.E.2d at 101 (immediate payment of
mother's expenses and registration with putative fathers' registry).
180. See, e.g., H.R., 581 A.2d at 1181 (best interests of the child will likely preclude trans-
fer); Robert 0., 604 N.E.2d at 103-04 (best interests of the child standard prevailed). Even
after an award of custody, the adoptive parents will not be quick to give up their child. See,
e.g., In re Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649, 652-54 (Mich. 1993) (adoptive parents obtained stays
following orders granting custody to biological father for nearly two years).
Visitation rights by the putative father are not generally considered, although it has been
suggested that "the courts' failure to consider post-adoption visitation is contrary to the best
interests requirement in adoption laws." Nathan, supra, note 14, at 648.
181. H.R., 581 A.2d at 1180. The court stated that it "should not foreclose the possibility
of a damages remedy, however inadequate, for violations of the father's statutory and constitu-
tional rights that may have caused prejudicial delay." Id.
182. See, e.g., Petrowsky v. Family Serv. of Decatur, 518 N.E.2d 664, 665-66 (11. App. Ct.
1987) (refusing to recognize the tort of adoption agency malpractice, despite recognition of the
tort of social work malpractice); Horak v. Biris, 474 N.E.2d 13, 17 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (recog-
nizing social work malpractice); Dunn v. Catholic Home Bureau for Dependent Children, 537
N.Y.S. 2d 742, 743 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989) (recognizing social work malpractice); see also infra
notes 220-40 and accompanying text (discussing adoption agency and social work
malpractice).
183. See Buchanan, supra note 3, at 378 n.486 (alluding to a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cause of
action against an adoption agency by an unwed father); H.R., 581 A.2d at 1167, 1180 (alluding
to a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cause of action for procedural due process violations).
184. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972) (holding that a father has a constitution-
ally-protected liberty interest in a hearing before he is deprived of the custody of his illegiti-
mate children); Ellis v. Hamilton, 669 F.2d 510, 512 (7th Cir.) (holding that the liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment includes a parent's right
to the custody of their children), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1069 (1982); Swayne v. L.D.S. Soc.
Servs., 670 F. Supp. 1537, 1540 (D. Utah 1987) (holding that the termination of parental rights
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§ 1983,' against state adoption agency officials who fail to notify him of a
pending adoption action, alleging a violation of due process under the Four-
teenth Amendment. 1 86 To bring a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must first "allege
the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United
States," and second, show that the deprivation of this right was caused by a
person acting "under color of state law." 8 7 An unwed father is able to meet
the first prong of the test as a result of the Supreme Court's holdings in
Stanley, Caban, Quilloin, and Lehr, establishing a putative father's due pro-
cess right to participate in the adoption proceeding. 8
8
The second prong requires a showing that the person or entity that caused
the alleged deprivation acted "under color of state law."' 18 9 Traditionally, an
is the deprivation of a liberty interest "worthy of constitutional protection"), citing Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
185. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). This section provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or us-
age, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id.
186. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; see Swayne, 670 F. Supp. at 1541-44. In Swayne, a
putative father brought an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in which he attempted to gain
custody of his infant child who was surrendered to a private adoption agency by the mother.
Id. The father had not married, supported, or provided for the mother, and failed to register
in the Utah putative father registry. Id. at 1538-39.
187. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). In order for there to be a violation of due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment the state must be involved, as provided in the Con-
stitution. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o
State shall make or enforce any law which shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." Id. In a typical § 1983 action, the plaintiff alleges that
his or her rights were violated by the conduct of state officials without due process of law. Jack
M. Beermann, Government Official Torts and the Takings Clause. Federalism and State Sover-
eign Immunity, 68 B.U. L. REV. 277, 284 (1988). Beermann points out that "[the due process
allegation directs the court's focus to the procedures surrounding the deprivation" and that
"[c]ourts addressing due process claims under § 1983 ... have turned on... technical applica-
tions of the due process clause." Id. at 284-85. According to Beermann, cases in this area "are
united by an undercurrent of concern over the appropriate federal response to state conduct
that causes injury to private parties." Id. at 285; see also STONE, supra note 17, at 1594;
Daniel Steiner, Note, Due Process and Section 1983: Limiting Parratt v. Taylor to Negligent
Conduct, 71 CAL. L. REV. 253, 261 (1983) (explaining that § 1983 actions generally involve
challenges to established state procedures). Stone explains that the Fourteenth Amendment is
based on the theory that an extension of federal law is necessary to preserve individual rights.
STONE, supra note 17, at 1594. There has always been a conflict between a state deprivation,
which is bestowed with to Fourteenth Amendment protection, and deprivations by private
behavior, which receives no such protection. Id. at 1597 (citing Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974)).
188. See supra notes 29-96 and accompanying text (discussing the development of putative
fathers' rights).
189. See supra note 187.
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entity is said to act "under color of state law" when its authority and power
are conferred by state law and it acts on behalf of the state.' 90 Thus, the
deprivation must be caused by the state or by a person for whom the state is
responsible.191 State employment renders a person a state actor. 192 If an
adoption agency fails to notify a putative father of an adoption proceeding
involving his child,193 resulting in the destruction of the unwed father's op-
portunity interest, then he is deprived of a recognized right or privilege.1 94
The party charged with the deprivation-the adoption agency-is often
state-run, and thus clearly a state actor.'95 Similarly, the conduct of private
adoption agencies can be characterized as state-action because parental
rights may only be terminated through the power of the state.'96 Thus, pri-
vate parties facilitating a mother's relinquishment of her child become state
190. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941). In Classic, the Court held that a
misuse of power made possible "because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state
law," is action taken " 'under color' of state law." Id.
191. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 n.18 (1982); see also LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 18-4, at 1703-05 (2d. ed. 1988). Tribe explains
that the existence of unconstitutional state action depends upon the factors relevant to the
specific constitutional guarantee at issue. Id. at 1705.
192. Id.; see also STONE, supra note 17, at 1659. The authors explain that the state action
doctrine is a "natural outgrowth of th[e] assumption" that much of our "personal freedom is
linked to the absence of governmental power." Id. The state action doctrine limits govern-
ment power by applying "constitutional limits when the government acts to restrict individual
liberty," and requiring "freedom from.., constitutional constraints when individuals act with-
out government assistance or support." Id. Thus, private actors do not need to make sure
that due process rights are not violated, however, state actors must take measures to protect
due process. Id. This distinction is obviously crucial and would need to be overcome by any
putative father charging a § 1983 deprivation of due process in an adoption carried out by a
private agency. See infra notes 196-98 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 98-115 and accompanying text (describing Appeal of H.R.).
194. Swayne v. L.D.S. Soc. Servs., 795 P.2d 637, 640 (Utah 1990) (holding that the termi-
nation of parental rights triggers state action for Fourteenth Amendment purposes).
195. See Swayne v. L.D.S. Soc. Servs., 670 F. Supp. 1537, 1543 (D. Utah 1987) (holding
that a state has a duty to act as guardian for adoptees; some of that duty is delegated to private
adoption agencies).
196. See id at 1541. In Swayne, the United States District Court for the District of Utah
found that "[t]he State of Utah, not a private party, made an official policy decision that any-
time custody of an illegitimate child is relinquished by the mother, the father's parental rights
are automatically cut off unless a notice of paternity was previously filed by the biological
father." Id. The state's decision "is implemented through the actor or actors who accept the
child for placement, whether a state entity, a private licensed adoption agency, or any other
person, for example an attorney." Id. at 1541-42. The court held that "[it would be a total
fiction to allow the state to remove itself from its decision to cut off parental rights simply
because a private party triggers operation of the statute." Id. at 1542 (emphasis in original).
Thus the court held that a private party becomes a state actor when his or her actions involve
the statute terminating parental rights. Id.
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actors 97 and as such, can be held responsible for violations of a putative
father's due process rights. 9 '
A deprivation under § 1983 does not have to be intentional.' 99 Negli-
gence on the part of state officials, such as adoption agencies, can result in a
deprivation of a putative father's rights.2 "° A mere showing of negligence,
however, is not enough-the deprivation must also occur as a result of an
established state procedure that is inherently inadequate. 20 ' Therefore, an
essential element of an unwed father's claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is a
showing that the state procedures are inadequate, even when correctly
followed.2 2
197. Id. In Swayne, the plaintiffs relied on a Utah statute that provided that when an
illegitimate child is relinquished by its mother, the rights of the father are automatically termi-
nated unless he has previously filed an acknowledgement of paternity. Id. at 1544. Parental
rights may only be terminated through the power of the State, thus, the Swayne court held that
when a party facilitated a mother's relinquishment, the party became a state actor. Id. at
1542-44.
198. Id. There are several ways to determine whether private adoption agencies are actu-
ally engaged in state action. See, e.g., Roe v. Catholic Charities, 588 N.E.2d 354, 359 (Il1.
App. Ct. 1992). In Roe, the court held that private adoption agencies are bound by the law of
the State. Id. The court recognized the established principle that a corporation may be sued
for the common law torts it commits. Id. The court used the principle of negligence for
airlines, railroads, hospitals and other corporations to hold an adoption agency liable. Id.
Still, courts do not want a finding of state action regarding private adoption agencies to "chill"
the actions of those agencies. See, e.g., Swayne, 670 F. Supp. at 1544. The Swayne court, in
finding that a private adoption agency was engaged in state action, held that "[t]his court does
not rule that all actions and decisions by private adoption agencies will be subject to review
under the constitution." Id.
199. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 534 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v.
Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). The Parratt Court held that "[n]othing in the language of
§ 1983 or its legislative history limits the statute solely to intentional deprivations of constitu-
tional rights." Id. In Parratt, a prisoner brought a § 1983 claim when a hobby kit he ordered
was lost by prison officials when the officials did not follow the proper procedures for receiving
packages. Id.
200. See supra notes 100-15 and accompanying text (discussing inadequate and improperly
followed adoption agency notification procedures).
201. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 543. Parratt's claim eventually failed because although he was
deprived of property under color of state law, "the deprivation did not occur as a result of
some established state procedure." Id. The deprivation occurred as a result of the failure of
prison officials to follow the procedures, but the procedures themselves were adequate. Id.; see
also Steiner, supra note 187, at 261 (discussing a § 1983 challenge on the basis of inadequate
state procedures).
202. See Ellis v. Hamilton, 669 F.2d 510, 514 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1069 (1982).
In Ellis, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected the plaintiffs'
§ 1983 claim for injunctive relief and damages against state welfare officers, where the plain-
tiffs' grandchildren were removed from the plaintiffs' homes and were adopted by a new fam-
ily. Id. at 510-12. The plaintiffs did not challenge the lack of notice under the state adoption
law, but rather, claimed that the state officers unreasonably deprived them of the companion-
ship of their children and then interfered with their ability to adopt them. Id. at 514. The
court held that "[d]ue process is denied ... only if the state fails to provide adequate machin-
ery for the correction of the inevitable errors that occur in legal proceedings." Id.
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The federal courts show great deference to state courts in family law cases
because of the "peculiarly local nature" of the law.20 3 Courts of federal ju-
risdiction have found that due process is not denied if the state provides
reasonable remedies for preventing the wrong.2° Federal courts recognize
that state courts are as equally determined to prevent due process violations
as the federal courts.2 °5 More significantly, to be successful with a federal
claim, a biological father must show that he has not done something to jeop-
ardize his opportunity interest. 20 6 Even if an unwed father could hurdle the
many obstacles in the way of a § 1983 cause of action, federal courts are
hesitant to recognize due process violations at every turn. 20 7
Additionally, governmental immunity may bar a cause of action against a
state-run agency.20 8 The Eleventh Amendment is interpreted as barring
suits in federal court against a state by citizens of that state.20 9 A suit
203. Id. at 515.
204. Id. The Ellis court held "that there is no denial of due process if the state provides
reasonable remedies for preventing families from being arbitrarily broken up by local domestic
relations officers." Id. A putative fathers' registry could be viewed as one of the reasonable
remedies provided by the state to prevent family breakup. See infra notes 258-85 (discussing
the putative fathers' registry).
205. Ellis, 669 F.2d at 515. The Ellis court found that "the courts of Indiana seem every
bit as determined to prevent such wrongs [due process violations] as the federal courts would
be." Id.
206. See supra notes 71-96 (discussing the fleeting nature of the opportunity interest).
207. Ellis, 669 F.2d at 514. In Ellis, the court hypothesized that
[i]f due process were denied every time local officials blundered, then any plaintiff in
state court who was asserting a right within the broadly defined categories of liberty
or property and who lost his case because the judge made an error could attack the
judgment indirectly by suing the judge under section 1983.
Id. In light of this, some commentators suggest that the notion of due process must be com-
bined with an understanding of society. See, e.g., RUBIN, supra note 10, at 4-5. Rubin points
out that "[d]ue process means procedure that is either fair or not fair in a particular con-
text .... Proper application of both constitutional standards depends, therefore, on a realistic
understanding of social facts rather than a picture of society that is biased and distorted by
being viewed through outmoded stereotypes." Id.; see also infra notes 213-19 (discussing the
reluctance of federal courts to become involved if an adequate remedy lies at the state court
level).
208. See Engstrom v. Iowa, 461 N.W.2d 309, 312 (Iowa 1990). In Engstrom, an adoption
agency misrepresented facts about an adoptee's background and then claimed it was immune
from suit for misrepresentation. Id.; see also ANDREA SALTZMAN & KATHLEEN PROCH,
LAW IN SOCIAL WORK PRACTICE 417-18 (1990) (discussing immunity from malpractice suits
for social workers); Buchanan, supra note 3, at 378 n.486 (asserting that although a remedy for
unwed fathers would "presumably arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983" this does not account for
"the multitude of problems associated with such a claim," including state action and immunity
problems).
209. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15-18 (1890) (interpreting the Eleventh Amendment).
But see Rubacha v. Coler, 607 F. Supp. 477, 480 (N.D. I11. 1985) (stating that the Eleventh
Amendment may historically have been misinterpreted "to bar suits against a state by citizens
of that state"). The Eleventh Amendment reads: "The Judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
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against a state official is considered to be a suit against the state for Eleventh
Amendment purposes.2 ' A putative father, therefore, must sue state adop-
tion officials in their individual capacities to avoid Eleventh Amendment
problems.2 1' In contrast to states, local governments are not immune from
suit in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.212 In most cases the putative
father's claim will be against a local government agency; however, even with
the more lenient approach toward suits in federal court against local govern-
ments, federal courts are reluctant to extend the arm of federal law into the
state forum.2 1 3 Furthermore, many states have provisions that indemnify
state officials and state employees from damages resulting from uninten-
tional conduct.2 14 Thus, even if a putative father is successful in obtaining a
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
210. Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620 (1963) (stating that suits against state officials
impinge on the public treasury and domain, and interfere with public administration, similar
to suits against the state).
211. Rubacha, 607 F. Supp. at 480. The Rubacha court pointed out that suits against
defendants in their official capacities are suits against the state. Id. However, the plaintiff's
claim was successful because "each defendant [was] sued in his or her individual capacity as
well." Id. (emphasis in original). This avoids Eleventh Amendment problems. Id,
212. Beermann, supra note 187, at 277 n.I (citing Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S.
622, 635-58 (1980) (rejecting a lower court award of immunity to a municipality that was sued
under § 1983 for a Fourteenth Amendment violation)).
A number of states have largely abolished governmental immunity. W. PAGE KEETON ET
AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 131, at 1045 (5th ed. 1984). Many
procedural limitations also have been imposed on suits against the government. Id. Often
"the claimant must attempt an administrative settlement" before turning to the courts, and a
jury trial is generally not available. Id. Recoveries may be limited to specific dollar amounts,
and claims must be filed soon after the injury. Id. at 1045-46. All of these considerations add
to the difficulty of an unwed father bringing a successful action against a state or local adop-
tion agency.
213. See Beermann, supra note 187, at 279 (asserting that federal courts are hesitant to
interfere with state sovereignty due to a "contemporary conservative federalism ideology,
which embraces a fundamental revulsion against federal control over state official conduct");
see also Swayne v. L.D.S. Soc. Servs., 670 F. Supp. 1537, 1548-49 (D. Utah 1987) (abstaining
from hearing a putative father's § 1983 action on the grounds that the father would have an
adequate opportunity for review in state court).
214. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, para. 1302(c) (1992) (stating that unless there is
intentional misconduct, a judge will be indemnified against all damages resulting from his
judicial and administrative duties); see also Rubacha, 607 F. Supp. at 481 n.9 (referring to ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 127, para. 1302(c)); National Bank v. Leir, 325 N.W.2d 845, 847 (S.D. 1982)
(holding that sovereign immunity precluded a suit by minors against social workers in their
individual capacity for alleged negligent placement and supervision in a sexually abusive foster
home); KEETON, supra note 212, § 131 at 1047-48. Keeton explains that governmental im-
munity protects against suits for certain types of negligence in the administration of govern-
ment programs. Id. As a matter of public policy, some immunity remains as a shield against
municipal liability. Id. § 131 at 1052. Keeton states that because many municipal decisions
"involve the dilemma of policy intended to be resolved by the legislative or executive branches,
the courts will refuse to review them in tort actions." Id.
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judgment against the adoption agency, he must seek to enforce the judgment
over the state's indemnification of the employees.215
Finally, there are several policy issues which could make an unwed fa-
ther's § 1983 suit difficult. State law is seen as an articulation of the policies
and values of the people of that state.216 To allow federal courts to intervene
too frequently in state matters may interfere with the values of the citizens of
the state.217 Additionally, because the federal courts are generally invoked
to address the more pervasive problems of the states and their citizens, the
issues that arise in family cases are often better resolved at the state court
level.218 Powerful principles of state autonomy may weigh heavily against
the unwed father's claim in federal court.21 9
2. Adoption Agency Malpractice
A second possible cause of action available to an unwed father is a mal-
practice claim against the adoption agency. A malpractice action involves
an allegation that a professional person, who is expected to possess a mini-
mum amount of experience and to have reached a certain level of compe-
tence, failed to exercise reasonable care 22' and departed from the standard of
care required of their profession. 22 By undertaking to render adoption serv-
215. Rubacha, 607 F. Supp. at 481. An indemnification statute, however, should not pre-
clude the putative father's ability to bring the action against the employees as individuals. To
do so "would give the State carte blanche to provide a meaningless kind of paper protection-
granting an 'indemnification' that would, by its very existence, destroy the liability to which
the indemnity purportedly extends." Id. The Rubacha court found that this would "uncon-
scionably insulate State employees from all liability for their tortious and unconstitutional
actions. After all, the Eleventh Amendment was designed to protect sovereign States, not
individual citizens." Id.
216. Beermann, supra note 187, at 287 & n.34. Beermann points out that realistically,
however, "state common law is often merely an aggregation of conflicting policy preferences
established by various tribunals at various times." Id. Still, federal courts treat these "loosely
aggregated decisions of state courts as authoritative pronouncements of state policy." Id.
217. See Swayne, 670 F. Supp. at 1548 (stating that federal courts should defer to the state
courts to allow them to fulfill their duty to further state policies which "balanc[e] the compet-
ing interests in adoption cases consistent with federal constitutional principles").
218. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986) (stating that the United States Constitu-
tion is designed to allocate governing authority among the federal government branches and
the states, and to secure certain rights); see infra note 219.
219. Often, the federal courts are reluctant to take on smaller, state oriented matters, Beer-
mann, supra note 187, at 299. Beermann maintains that state autonomy should be preserved
in many matters so that the federal courts are not overrun with smaller litigation matters. Id.
220. KEETON, supra note 212, § 32, at 185. Keeton explains that most of the decided
professional malpractice cases deal with surgeons and other doctors, but that the same stan-
dard applies to "dentists, pharmacists, psychiatrists ... and many other professions and skilled
trades." Id. at 185-86.
221. See, e.g., Dunn v. Catholic Home Bureau for Dependent Children, 537 N.Y.S. 2d 742,
743 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989). In Dunn, the plaintiff sought money damages for social work mal-
practice, where she had placed her child with the adoption agency, and where after the plaintiff
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ices, the adoption agency holds itself out as possessing the requisite standard
of professional skill and knowledge.2 2 2 Applying this standard, an adoption
agency is expected to know of the putative father's constitutionally protected
right to notice of a pending adoption proceeding involving his child. 22 ' An
adoption agency's failure to attempt to locate the father, or failure to follow
through on attempts to notify him, are factors that will be considered in
determining negligence.22 4 Evidence demonstrating that it is common for
an agency to be unsuccessful in its efforts to notify the putative father of an
adoption proceeding would not relieve the agency of its duty to the father.2 25
Recent cases have held that adoption agencies are required to adhere to a
higher standard of care, 2 2 6 based on the premise that adoption agencies are
responsible to society as a whole.22 7
revoked her consent to surrender for adoption, her child was not returned to her. Id. The
court found that an adequate statutory framework existed within which to address whether or
not the social worker departed from the standard of conduct of the profession. Id.; see also
Horak v. Biris, 474 N.E.2d 13, 19 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985). In Horak, the court recognized "social
work malpractice" as a cause of action because the legislature had provided social work licens-
ing standards, and therefore a statutory framework existed to determine whether malpractice
took place. Id. The court found that the legislature was so concerned with the quality of the
social work profession that it provided procedures to eliminate incompetent social workers.
Id.
222. KEETON, supra note 212, § 32, at 185-87. Keeton points out that this skill is expected
to be the "knowledge, skill and care ordinarily possessed and employed by members of the
profession in good standing." Id. at 187 (footnote omitted).
223. An agency would be expected to know of the father's right because the standard that
is applied is a general, national standard of conduct based on what is "customary and usual in
the profession." Id. at 189.
It is important to note, however, that the putative father may be as much the cause of his
failure to receive notice of the adoption proceeding as the agency. See SALTZMAN & PROCH,
supra note 208, at 417. Saltzman and Proch point out that even if it can be established that the
social worker owed a duty to a plaintiff in a malpractice action, it may be difficult to prove a
breach of that duty. Id. Additionally, the plaintiff may be unable to show that an injury was
foreseeable from the breach of duty. Id.
224. KEETON, supra note 212, § 33, at 195 (finding that "the failure to comply with cus-
tomary precaution may ... be negligence in itself").
225. Id. at 194. Keeton argues that the fact that an entire industry uses "slip-shod meth-
ods cannot serve as absolution for the [entity] being sued." Id. at 194-95. Granting such
absolution would provide no incentive to improve deficient practices. Id. at 195.
226. See, e.g., Michael J. v. Los Angeles County Dep't of Adoptions, 247 Cal. Rptr. 504
(Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (dealing with a suit by an adoptive parent and her adoptive child against a
county department of adoptions for negligence and fraud due to agency misrepresentation of
the child's health).
227. Id. at 513. The California court held that:
[w]e cannot countenance conduct which would allow persons who desire entrance
into the emotional realm of parenting to be unprotected from schemes or tactics
designed to discharge societal burdens onto the unsuspecting or unwary. As trustees
of the child's destiny the agency was obligated to act with morals greater than those
found in a purveyor's common marketplace.
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A handful of jurisdictions have adopted a social worker malpractice cause
of action,228 which has been analogized to an adoption agency malpractice
cause of action.22 9 In accordance with this parallel, some states have ex-
tended common law principles of negligence to hold adoption agencies ac-
countable for their actions. 230 Negligence, much like malpractice, requires a
showing of a duty, breach, causation, and damages to grant recovery. 23 I
The basis of negligence is not carelessness, but behavior on the part of one
individual that presents an unreasonable risk of harm to other members of
the community.2 32 To determine whether a duty exists, the probability of
228. See, e.g., Horak v. Bins, 474 N.E.2d 13, 17 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985). In Horak, the Illinois
Court recognized a cause of action for social worker malpractice where the defendant held
himself out as a social worker, his duties placed him in a position of trust, and where he
consequently breached his duty to the plaintiff when he had sexual relations with the plaintiff's
wife during marital counseling. Id. The court found that the counselor had mishandled the
transference phenomenon, a common psychological treatment, which amounted to malprac-
tice. Id. at 18; cf Martino v. Family Serv. Agency, 445 N.E.2d 6 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982). In
Martino, the Illinois court did not recognize the tort of social worker malpractice where a
marriage counselor engaged in sexual relations with the husband of the couple she was coun-
seling. Id. at 8. The court found that the conduct, while improper, was not intended to harm.
Id. at 9.
229. States have recognized this tort where a social worker functions as a counselor or
psychotherapist. See Horak, 474 N.E.2d at 17; see also Engstrom v. Iowa, 461 N.W.2d 309,
316 (Iowa 1990) (noting the similarity between the "duties and discretion statutorily required
of social workers in child removal situations and foster care placements" and the "responsibili-
ties in termination proceedings and adoption placements").
When determining whether or not to extend a cause of action to a new area, courts will
determine whether the legislature intended to create a cause of action when the particular law
was drafted. Engstrom, 461 N.W.2d at 315-16. In Engstrom, the court concluded that the
legislature did not intend to create a private cause of action for pre-adoptive parents where the
adoption placement was not finalized due to complications. Id. at 316. In a jurisdiction that
has not yet addressed the duty of an adoption agency to notify the unwed father regarding
adoption proceedings, a court will likely look to see whether the legislature, in drafting the
relevant statute, intended to create a cause of action for a putative father whose rights were
violated.
230. It is a well-recognized principle that new reaches of law grow out of existing statutory
requirements. Roe v. Catholic Charities, 588 N.E.2d 354, 357 (Il1. App. Ct.), appeal denied,
602 N.E.2d 475 (Il1. 1992). In Roe, adoptive parents brought a cause of action against an
adoption agency for fraud, breach of contract, and negligence. Id. at 356. Although Illinois
had not recognized this cause of action in the past, the court found that recognition of this
cause of action was "not a dramatic, radical departure from the established common law of the
State of Illinois." Id. at 357. The court held that "[i]t is rather an extension of the doctrine of
common law fraud. This is how the common law traditionally grows; it responds to the needs
of the society it serves." Id.; see also Foster v. Bass, 575 So. 2d 967 (Miss. 1990). In Foster, an
adoptive father filed a complaint against an adoption agency for failing to assure that his
adopted child was tested for phenylketonuria (PKU) at birth. Id. at 968-69. The father al-
leged that the adoption agency "owed a duty to exercise reasonable care in investigating the
health of [the child] and in advising his prospective adoptive parents of any health problems."
Id. at 972.
231. Foster, 575 So.2d at 972.
232. KEETON, supra note 212, § 31, at 169-70.
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harm resulting from the breached duty must be foreseeable.233 In addition
to the foreseeability of harm, many factors must be considered, including the
degree of certainty of injury as a result of the conduct, the connection be-
tween the conduct and the injury, the moral blame associated with the con-
duct, and the prevention of future harm.2 34
Not every jurisdiction has confronted an adoption agency malpractice ac-
tion, and of those that have, a number of states have refused to recognize
it.235 Those that have faced the issue have struggled with the scope of the
duty owed by the agency.236 In general, courts are reluctant to imply a
cause of action or to impose tort liability upon a state and its employees in
carrying out their statutory duties in the area of family law.237 In cases
233. Id. at 975. In Foster, both parties asserted that in order to succeed on a negligence-
based action, it must be demonstrated that the actor should have foreseen the probability of
harm from his conduct. Id. The Foster court, considering many factors, held that the agency
"reasonably could not have foreseen ... that the medical professionals would be negligent in
performing their duties." Id. at 981. Although an unwed father might be successful in dem-
onstrating that the harm to him was foreseeable, the courts would subject the facts and cir-
cumstances of each case to extensive analysis. See supra notes 99-171 (subjecting each father's
case to critical analysis by the courts).
234. Richard P. v. Vista Del Mar Child Care Serv., 165 Cal. Rptr. 370, 373 (Cal. Ct. App.
1980). In Richard P., the court considered these factors in addition to "the extent of the
burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise
care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance
for the risk involved." Id.; see PHILIP E. DAVIS, MORAL DUTY AND LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY
(1966) (discussing the development of duties and responsibilities within society and the
problems associated with assigning liability for specific acts and justifying those decisions); see
also SALTZMAN & PROCH, supra note 208, at 412-30 (discussing the nature of professional
liability for social workers and their corresponding duties and responsibilities).
235. See, e.g., Petrowsky v. Family Serv., 518 N.E.2d 664, 665-66 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987),
appeal denied, 522 N.E.2d 1256 (Ill. 1988). In Petrowsky, the court specifically rejected such a
claim where preadoptive parents sued a private adoption agency for deficient paperwork and
investigation regarding the paternity of an adopted child. Id. at 665. The court held that "no
precedent or policy compell[ed it] to recognize the tort of adoption agency malpractice." Id.
at 666. See also National Bank v. Leir, 325 N.W.2d 845, 847 (S.D. 1982) (holding that the
state had not expressly used the terms "social worker malpractice" or "adoption agency mal-
practice" in the past, and would not begin to do so); see also SALTZMAN & PROCH, supra note
208, at 413 (asserting that it may be difficult to impose malpractice liability against social
workers). Saltzman and Proch argue that the tort of social work malpractice may not be
recognized because in some jurisdictions, social work may not be viewed as a profession requir-
ing special skills and training, and because the parameters of the social work profession may
not be clearly defined, particularly where social workers are not licensed or credentialed. Id.
236. Foster, 575 So. 2d at 979-81. In Foster, the court found that the child's disease could
not be known to the agency because the PKU test is normally performed by the hospital and
the agency has no role in the process. Id. at 981. However, the court struggled with its deci-
sion because the case was one of first impression, and there was limited analogous authority
from other jurisdictions. Id. at 979. The court held that "[w]e have been able to find only a
limited number of analogous cases from other jurisdictions, which discuss the duty of care
imposed upon adoption agencies in placing children." Id.
237. See Engstrom v. Iowa, 461 N.W.2d 309, 315 (Iowa 1990) (holding that the legislature
did not intend a tort action against the state in some child care situations); see also Smith v.
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involving adoption agencies, it is difficult to satisfy many of the conditions
necessary to attach liability. 238 Additionally, the remedy that an unwed fa-
ther may be awarded is often difficult to determine.239 Finally, courts are
sensitive to the principle that adoption agencies provide an unparalleled op-
portunity to couples who may be otherwise unable to raise a family.2"
B. Public Policy Concerns
Some courts fear that imposing liability on adoption agencies will frustrate
the agencies in their operations.241 Other courts view the injuries inflicted
upon persons involved in the adoption process as unavoidable, and see them
as an ever-present factor in a complex society.242 Adoption agencies have
argued persuasively against the recognition of additional duties that may
Alameda County Soc. Servs. Agency, 153 Cal. Rptr. 712 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (rejecting a
claim that a county adoption agency negligently failed to take reasonable action to prompt a
child's adoption); Leir, 325 N.W.2d at 847 (holding that sovereign immunity precluded a suit
by minors against social workers, in their individual capacity, for alleged negligent placement
in a sexually abusive foster home); supra notes 214-15 (discussing governmental immunity).
238. See supra note 234 and accompanying text (listing the factors to be assessed when
considering the imposition of liability).
239. Damage actions against social workers are a "relatively recent phenomenon, arising
primarily in the past few decades." Engstrom, 461 N.W.2d at 316. Successful damages ac-
tions indicate that gross negligence will result in a successful claim. See, e.g., Haselhorst v.
Nebraska, 485 N.W.2d 180, 189-90 (Neb. 1992) (awarding damages where a social service
agency failed to discover a foster child's medical history of violent tendencies, and the foster
child sexually abused the foster parent's children). In Haselhorst, damages of approximately
$600,000, awarded to the foster parents and their four minor children, were not deemed exces-
sive to compensate for the state's negligence in failing to prevent the foster child from pursuing
his conduct. Id. The court held that "to contend to the contrary is an attempt to further
minimize the flagrant damages that the State and its agents allowed to be inflicted on the
plaintiffs." Id. at 190.
240. Richard P. v. Vista Del Mar Child Care Serv., 165 Cal. Rptr. 370, 374 (Cal. Ct. App.
1980). The Richard P. court recognized that proposed liability could " 'impede the proper
functioning of adoption agencies.' " Id. (quoting Smith v. Alameda County Soc. Servs.
Agency, 153 Cal. Rptr. 712, 716 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979)).
241. See, e.g., Smith, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 716-17 (holding that an agency does not have a duty
to find a child an adoptive home). The Smith court rejected a 17-year-old boy's claim against a
county adoption agency. Id. at 717. The boy had been in the agency's custody since the age of
two, and he charged the agency with failure to find him a permanent home. Id.; see also
Richard P., 165 Cal. Rptr. at 374 (adopting the Smith court's stance that liability could im-
pede the functioning of adoption agencies).
242. Martino v. Family Serv. Agency, 445 N.E.2d 6, 9 (I11. App. Ct. 1982); see also Eng-
strom, 461 N.W.2d at 317. In Engstrom, the adoption agency failed to determine that the
adopted child's father was still alive. Id. at 312. The court held this failure did not give rise to
a tort of negligence grounded on professional malpractice stating that "social workers [do not]
owe an actionable duty to preadoptive parents to determine whether a natural parent is alive or
dead." Id. at 317.
While such cases are difficult, some courts view them as an opportunity to "grapple with the
duties and responsibilities of a private adoption agency in placing children." Foster v. Bass,
575 So. 2d 967, 967 (Miss. 1990).
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place unreasonable burdens on the agencies.243 The agencies assert that po-
tential liability would discourage adoptions and render some children diffi-
cult to place. 244 Although public policy recognizes some duties and
obligations that adoption agencies must exercise,245 the limitations of adop-
tion agencies are clearly understood.246
243. Successful actions have been brought against adoption agencies where the agency fails
to disclose information about a child's genetic parents and medical background. See, e.g.,
M.H. v. Caritas Family Servs., 488 N.W.2d 282, 288 (Minn. 1992). In Caritas, the court held
that public policy does not preclude a negligent misrepresentation action against an adoption
agency where the agency negligently withholds information and misleads the adoptive parents.
Id. The adoption agency in Caritas informed the adoptive parents that there may have been
incest in the child's background, which the parents accepted. Id. However, the agency never
told the adoptive parents that the child's actual parents were a 17-year-old boy and his 13-
year-old sister. Id. at 285. The agency argued that they should not be required to indepen-
dently verify family histories given to them by genetic parents. Id. at 287. Similarly, agencies
can argue that requiring them to verify information provided by an unwed mother regarding
the paternity of a child places an unreasonable burden on their activity.
244. This is not an unlikely result of imposing liability. Already, adoption agencies "bend
over backwards to accommodate the interests of biological fathers. Often this amounts to
denying women the opportunity of adoption, if a biological father cannot be found because the
risk of future litigation is a risk that few agencies or adoptive parents are willing to take."
Letter from Mary Beth Seader, M.S.W., Vice President for Policy and Practice, National
Council for Adoption to Alexandra R. Dapolito (Jan. 15, 1993) (on file with author).
245. Some courts have held that the recognition of additional duties in certain situations
does not unduly burden adoption agencies. This concept stems from the fact that adoption
agencies are not to be relieved of liability where the agency intentionally conceals or misrepre-
sents the health of an adoptee. See, e.g., Caritas, 488 N.W.2d at 288 (holding that the imposi-
tion of a duty to provide accurate medical information "merely requires [the agencies] to use
due care to ensure that when they undertake to disclose information about a child's genetic
parents and medical history, they disclose that information fully and adequately so as not to
mislead prospective adoptive parents"); see also Michael J. v. Los Angeles County Dep't of
Adoptions, 247 Cal. Rptr. 504, 511-13 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (stating that pubic policy does not
condone the concealment or intentional misrepresentation of information that misleads the
adoptive parents); Burr v. Board of County Comm'rs, 491 N.E.2d 1101, 1109 (Ohio 1986)
(withholding information about a child's health by an adoption agency deprives adoptive par-
ents of the right to make their decision "in an intelligent manner"). The principle that adop-
tion agencies should be held liable in health-related circumstances is long-established. See,
e.g., County Dep't of Public Welfare v. Morningstar, 151 N.E.2d 150, 155 (Ind. App. Ct.
1958). In Morningstar, the court set aside an adoption where the Department of Public Wel-
fare informed the adoptive parents that a child was in adequate physical and mental health,
when in actuality, the Department was aware that the child had been sexually abused by her
natural father. Id. The Indiana court held that it could not condone "such dishonest conduct
of a public welfare agency." Id.
246. See, e.g., Richard P. v. Vista Del Mar Child Care Serv., 165 Cal. Rptr. 370, 374 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1980) (holding that adoptive parents could not bring a suit for fraudulent misrepre-
sentation where a child later developed health problems, for to impose liability "would in effect
make the adoption agency a guarantor of the infant's future good health"); see also Foster v.
Bass, 575 So. 2d 967, 979-81 (Miss. 1990) (finding that an adoption agency cannot be held
responsible for a doctor's failure to diagnose a child's health problems). Contra Roe v. Catho-
lic Charities, 588 N.E.2d 354, 360 (Ill. App. Ct.) (finding that requiring an adoption agency to
disclose a child's disability to the adoptive parents is consistent with the law, ensures against
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Not surprisingly, the putative father's rights established by the Supreme
Court collide with the powerful public policies that protect adoption agen-
cies, the validity of adoption decrees, and the rights of adoptive parents.24 7
Thus, there is inherent tension between the acknowledged ability and poten-
tial of an unwed father to successfully fulfill his parental role, 248 enhanced
by the increasing acceptance of non-traditional families,24 9 and the state's
interest in expediting and finalizing adoptions to create a family, which is in
the child's best interest.25 °
The growing trend of taking extraordinary steps to grant natural fathers a
hearing on fitness places many potential and some finalized adoptions in
jeopardy.2 5' There is grave dissatisfaction with the present accommodation
of putative fathers in adoption proceedings.2 52 Judges and adoptive families
recognized that in many cases, putative fathers follow up on their supposed
fraud, and does not make the agency a guarantor of the child's "future health and happiness"),
appeal denied, 602 N.E.2d 475 (Ill. 1992).
Often the statutes that govern family-service agencies recognize that they cannot be ex-
pected to make affirmative efforts to reunite families. See In re A.C., 597 A.2d 920, 925 (D.C.
1991) (rejecting the duty of a social service agency to make reasonable efforts to foster the
reunification of a family); cf In re Lori D., 510 A.2d 421, 424 (R.I. 1986) (commending a
family-service agency for its efforts to bring a family together). Similarly, if adoption agencies
were burdened with a statutory-charge to keep natural families together, their ability to func-
tion would be greatly obstructed.
247. See, e.g., In re M.N.M., 605 A.2d 921, 932 (D.C. 1992) (Gallagher, J., dissenting)
(asserting that "prospective adoptive parents could not reasonably be expected to pursue
[adoption] if after the whole long process is ended, they may nevertheless sometime in the
future lose their adopted child to one claiming a higher priority, e.g., a putative natural par-
ent"), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 636 (1992).
248. See supra notes 29-96 and accompanying text (discussing the development of the un-
wed father's rights); see also SALTZMAN & PROCH, supra note 208, at 214. The authors point
out that "[d]espite Lehr and the provisions of any applicable State statutes, it is good practice
to attempt to locate and involve fathers, not only when termination is being considered, but
also early on in the process of intervention. The father and his family may be viable placement
resources." Id.
249. See DONALD BRIELAND ET AL., CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL WORK: AN INTRODUC-
TION TO SOCIAL WORK AND SOCIAL WELFARE 253 (3d ed. 1985). Brieland asserts that "[t]he
family form regarded as 'traditional' is composed of two married parents giving care to one or
more of their own children." Id. Brieland points out that the current shape of many families
has shifted away from the traditional form, due to the rise in the divorce rate and large num-
bers of births outside of marriage, among other factors. Id. The number of fathers serving as
single parents increased 61 percent between 1970 and 1981. Id. at 254. Significantly, no state
prohibits adoption by single adults. Id. at 253.
250. See RUBIN, supra note 10, at 47. Rubin asserts that "[u]nder the traditional family
ideology, the biological, unmarried father is ignored; a protected status is accorded to the
family, once established.... The family is protected in large part because its functions include
not only reproduction, but also the support and education of the resulting children." Id.
251. See supra notes 100-71 and accompanying text.
252. See Adoption of Kelsey S., 823 P.2d 1216, 1237 (Cal. 1992) (stating that a father's
actions once he discovers he is a father are crucial); Appeal of H.R., 581 A.2d 1141, 1201
(D.C. 1990) (Belson, J., dissenting) (listing the ways H.R. could have protected his interest); In
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interest in their children in a highly untimely fashion. 25 3 It is feared that if
excessive deference is given to putative fathers, adoptive parents may lose
confidence in the possibility of adoption as a parenting option. 2 4
The lack of legal remedies and burdensome public policies weigh heavily
against an unwed father in the courts, and accommodating his interests in a
delayed manner threatens the institution of adoption.25 5 For this reason, a
statutory solution is necessary to balance the rights and interests of the un-
wed father with those of the adoptive parents and the children. State legisla-
tures are the appropriate venue for weighing the issues and tensions
surrounding putative father's rights. 256 An appropriate legislative solution
will eliminate lengthy and difficult court battles, while simultaneously pro-
tecting the putative father's due process rights and preserving the institution
of adoption. This legislative answer is the putative fathers' registry.
2 5 7
re M.N.M., 605 A.2d 921, 931 (D.C. 1992) (Gallagher, J., dissenting) (failing to accept view
that the putative father was "floundering in legal maze"), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 636 (1992).
253. See DeBoer v. DeBoer, Nos. A-64, A-65, 1993 U.S. LEXIS 4665, *2-*3 (July 30, 1993)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); M.N.M., 605 A.2d at 931-32 (Gallagher, J., dissenting). Judge
Gallagher expressed his concern when he wrote:
I am unable to view this record as portraying a young man floundering alone in a
legal maze .... It is something of a mystery on this record as to why, having learned
of the local adoption proceeding, he did not . . .pursue his parentage claim ...
during all those months, but instead waited until it was much too late and then filed
the motion.
Id.; see also H.R., 581 A.2d at 1199 (Belson, J., dissenting). Judge Belson noted:
The record strongly supports the trial judge's finding that the notice appellant re-
ceived gave him sufficient information to enable him to come forward in timely fash-
ion to establish a father-son relationship if he was then disposed to do so and to
enable him to assert seasonably his legal rights as a natural father.
Id.; see also Kelsey S., 823 P.2d at 1237 (holding that the father's conduct throughout the
period since he learned he was the father must be considered).
254. M.N.M., 605 A.2d at 932 (Gallagher, J., dissenting) (asserting that there is a "strong
public interest in protecting the finality of adoption decrees" and that "[i]f adoptive parents are
at risk of losing an adoptive child ...this might chill locally the movement toward child
adoption").
255. See supra notes 172-246 (discussing the lack of remedies and the public policies).
256. The state legislatures are where a population's preferences are debated and policy
choices are made. See supra notes 203-07, 216-19 (discussing federal deference to state choices
in many areas).
257. See FACTBOOK, supra note 1, at 151. The National Council for Adoption stresses the
lack of clarity surrounding unwed fathers' rights and "urges states to pass laws similar to the
constitutionally-sound New York putative fathers' registry. In addition, agencies are urged to
involve biological fathers in counseling and adoption planning to the most appropriate and
possible extent." Id.
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IV. SOLUTION: THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
A putative father has a constitutionally-secured right to notice of an adop-
tion proceeding.25 8 It is clear that once the deprivation of this right occurs,
there are few legal remedies for the putative father to pursue.259 Lehr v.
Robertson 260 established that legislative schemes requiring a putative father
to demonstrate his commitment to his child within a specific period of time
are legitimate. 26 ' A putative fathers' registry is an ideal option for state leg-
islatures, because it balances protection of an unwed father's interests with
the state's interest in finalizing adoptions.26 2
In practice, a putative fathers' registry provides automatic notice of a
pending adoption to all legal fathers.263 Any man not a legal father under
the statutory scheme who desires to assert his paternity and parental rights
must take the initiative to provide the registry with all necessary informa-
tion.264 The registry records the name, address, and other relevant informa-
tion about the putative father.26 5 The putative fathers' registry provides for
258. See supra notes 22-96 and accompanying text (outlining fathers' rights). It is un-
doubtedly recognized that "[siound, ethical, legal adoption practice in the U.S. requires that,
with a few notable exceptions such as rape ... efforts be made to reach putative fathers ......
Fathers' Rights, supra note 4, at 1.
259. See supra notes 172-250 and accompanying text (discussing legal rights and the public
policies that weigh against the putative father).
260. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
261. Id. at 266-68.
262. Infra notes 252-56 and accompanying text.
263. Fathers' Rights, supra note 4, at 3. For example, "legal" fathers entitled to notice
under New York's scheme are men married to the mother at the time of the child's birth; men
adjudicated to be the legal father; men named as the father on the birth certificate; men living
with the mother at the time of the child's birth; and men named by the mother as the father.
Id.
It should be noted that many states have established "voluntary adoption registries." These
registries should not be confused with the putative fathers' registries. Voluntary adoption re-
gistries are designed to promote an exchange of biological information between adoptees and
their biological parents. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 109 (1991). The information contained in
such registries includes medical, health, ethnic, and religious information, which may be made
available to adult adoptees interested in their genetic and social history, and to birth parents,
who are interested in learning identifying information about the children they placed for adop-
tion. Id. § 109.430. These registries serve different functions than putative fathers' registries,
which are designed specifically to provide notice to unwed fathers regarding adoption proceed-
ings involving their biological children.
264. The responsibility to register is on the putative father, and failure to do so can have
disastrous consequences. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 251 (finding that the father's claim went un-
protected because he did not register); In re Reeves, 831 S.W.2d 607, 609 (Ark. 1992) (holding
that a putative father would have been entitled to notice of the adoption of his son had he
registered in putative fathers' registry).
265. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-18-704 (Michie 1992). In some states, registry infor-
mation can be used for various other purposes, such as locating fathers for child support. See
GA. CODE ANN. § 19-11-9(e) (Michie Supp. 1992) (stating that a fathers' registry may be used
to enforce support obligations). This is an obvious benefit of having such detailed information
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the unwed father's right to notification of the adoption proceeding, but does
not create a requirement that he approve of the proceeding. 266 Further, lack
of knowledge of the registry is not a valid defense should a putative father
fail to register.267
Several states have already created putative fathers' registries.26 8 Particu-
lar elements of these registries make them successful. These factors should
be considered by states developing their own registries.
2 69
on file, however, this Comment does not address the use of the registry for such purposes, nor
the implications of this practice.
266. Fathers' Rights, supra note 4, at 3.
267. See, e.g., Reeves, 831 S.W.2d at 608 (interpreting Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248
(1983), as holding that "the possibility the father may have failed to register because of his
ignorance of the law was not a sufficient reason for criticizing the law itself"); Sanchez v.
L.D.S. Soc. Servs., 680 P.2d 753, 756 (Utah 1984). The Sanchez court held that
[i]t is not too harsh to require that those responsible for bringing children into the
world outside the established institution of marriage should be required either to
comply with those statutes that accord them the opportunity to assert their parental
rights or to yield to the method established by society to raise children in a manner
best suited to promote their welfare.
Id. In Sanchez, the court rejected an unwed father's petition to obtain custody of his child
where the putative father failed to follow the statutory procedures for protecting his parental
rights. Id. at 754-55.
Some states have adopted procedures similar to a putative fathers' registry. The typical
procedures allow a putative father to file a "[n]otice of intent to claim paternity." MONT.
CODE ANN. § 40-6-126 (1991). The notice contains the putative father's address, and a copy is
sent to the mother if her address is also listed. Id. The notice must be filed before the birth of
the child. Id. Fathers who file timely notices are entitled to notice of any hearing to determine
the identity of the child's father and a hearing to determine or terminate his parental rights.
Id. These procedures are also adequate means of protecting the unwed father's rights.
268. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-210 (Michie 1987); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-11-9
(1992); IDAHO CODE § 16-1513 (1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:400 (West 1992); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 192.016 (Vernon Supp. 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-20 (Michie Supp. 1993);
N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 111-a (McKinney 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 55.1 (West
1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-1-111 (1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-4.8 (1992).
269. States without putative fathers' registries often provide for some type of notice to the
putative father. See supra note 71 (listing state statutory notification procedures for putative
fathers). These provisions are not as effective as the registries. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:3-45 (West 1993). New Jersey's provision states that the notice requirement to a putative
father is satisfied if notice has either been served on the putative father, or if service cannot be
made, if notice has been sent by regular mail to the last address, discreet inquiries made among
relations, friends or employers, and of the post office, the Division of Motor Vehicles, the
county welfare office, the local police department and other similar agencies. Id. In any case
where the identity of a parent cannot be determined, or where the known parent is unable or
refuses to identify the other parent, service of notice on that parent shall be waived. Id. This
type of statute does not adequately protect the putative father, whereas the registry allows the
putative father to take control over his notification.
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A. Strict Enforcement
First, a putative fathers' registry must be strictly enforced.27° An effective
registry must require that unwed fathers register within the required time
frame or face the forfeiture of their opportunity to participate in the adop-
tion proceeding. 27' The sole purpose for the registry is to give the state the
ability to finalize an adoption, which is essential for the mental health and
emotional welfare of the children involved.272 If the registry's established
cutoff dates are not enforced, the registry looses its effectiveness.273
Although strict enforcement may appear harsh, rigid enforcement of the reg-
istry's requirements will avoid lengthy and destructive court battles.274 A
putative fathers' registry effectively advances public policies favoring expedi-
tious adoption proceedings only when all interested parties, including the
270. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-4.8 (1992). Utah's statutory provision provides
that putative fathers must register with the state Bureau of Vital Statistics prior to the place-
ment of a child with an adoption service in order to be valid. Id.; see also Sanchez, 680 P.2d at
755. Utah enforces its registry requirement stringently. Id. In Sanchez, an unwed father who
registered a day after the placement of his child with an adoption service was not permitted to
have custody of his child. Id.
271. Sanchez, 680 P.2d at 755. In Sanchez, the unwed father contended that the state
provision denied him liberty without due process, however, the court held that a reasonable
cutoff date was appropriate. Id. The same strict approach is used in other states. Under
Arkansas' putative fathers' registry, a father who fails to register denies himself the opportu-
nity to notice of potential adoption proceedings. See In re Reeves, 831 S.W.2d 607, 608-09
(Ark. 1992) (holding that unwed father's failure to register in the registry caused his loss of
notification of the adoption proceeding).
272. Sanchez, 680 P.2d at 755. New York also strictly construes its registry. See supra
note 179 (noting that a father's eventual registration with the registry will not cure delay).
Strict construction is absolutely necessary for the adoptee's emotional stability. See supra note
14 (discussing the best interests of the child standard).
273. The Utah Supreme Court held that a firm cutoff date for enrolling in the registry was
essential. Sanchez, 680 P.2d at 755. Although some allusion was made to the fact that the
social service agency might have had a duty to inform the unwed father of the registry's re-
quirements, the court did not address the issue in a definitive manner. Id. at 755 n.2. The
court stated: "Whether L.D.S. Social Services had some duty to inform is not established by
this record. But if it did and breached that duty, that does not constitute state action or result
in a violation of due process." Id.
274. See Reeves, 831 S.W.2d at 607-09. In Reeves, the mother, Lynn, reported to the adop-
tion agency that the father of the child was unknown, although she knew who he was, and the
father was aware she had given birth. Id. at 607. Lynn and father, Tom, were divorced, but
during a reconciliation effort she became pregnant. Id. She then married another man, and
although she and Tom acknowledged he was the father, when her new husband petitioned to
adopt the child, she listed the father as unknown. Id. Tom had not registered in the putative
father's registry. Id. Her new husband adopted the child, and when Tom petitioned to set the
adoption aside, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that because he had failed to register in the
putative fathers' registry, the adoption would remain final. Id. at 609. The court pointed out
that because Tom's petition did not challenge the constitutionality of the notice provisions of
the registry, thus, the court did not have cause to address it. Id. Without a constitutional
challenge, his failure to register alone ended his claim. Id.
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putative fathers, are required to adhere to the precise procedural require-
ments of the statute.2 75
B. Avoid Unnecessary Presumptions
In addition to strict enforcement of the statutory framework, states should
avoid the inclusion of unnecessary presumptions when developing the regis-
try. 276 The registry should provide automatic notice of adoption proceed-
ings to certain categories of fathers, while still allowing for any other man
who claims to be the father of the child to register.277 Unnecessary pre-
sumptions as applied can result in an unconstitutional infringement on the
biological father's due process rights.278 Therefore, a registry that avoids
presumptions of legitimacy will also avoid constitutional challenge.279
275. See supra notes 241-54 (discussing public policies favoring final adoption
proceedings).
276. The result of "procedure by presumption" is that it generally sours and proves un-
workable. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 647-58 (1972) (holding that a presumption that
unwed fathers are unfit parents is unconstitutional); In re Raquel Marie X., 559 N.E.2d 418,
424-26 (N.Y.) (finding a New York statutory scheme that required an unwed father to live
openly with the child's mother for six months before the child's adoption was unconstitu-
tional), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 984 (1990).
277. For example, California enacted the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) to provide a com-
prehensive scheme for determinations of paternity and enforcement of state support systems.
CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 7000-21 (West 1993). An unnecessary presumption of the UPA is that if a
child is born to a married woman, a presumed father exists-her husband-and "absent adop-
tion proceedings the biological father has no standing to sue for a declaration of paternity."
See Michael M. v. Giovanna F., 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 460, 463 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992). Thus, where
Giovanna, while pregnant with the child of and engaged to one man, broke the engagement
and subsequently married another man and delivered the child, the unwed father had no
standing to establish his paternity. Id. at 462-63.
278. The unwed father brought suit because the UPA as applied did not allow him to rebut
the presumption that the husband at the time of the birth is the presumed father. Michael M,
7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 467. The court, finding in favor of allowing the biological father to establish
his paternity, noted that its holding was limited to the situation where unwed parents conceive,
and the mother marries another man before the birth of the child. Id. at 468. In such a
situation the biological father's due process right to a relationship with his child required that
he be allowed standing under the UPA to establish paternity, so long as he had taken prompt
steps to preserve his interest. Id.
279. The unwed father's suit prompted the California court to balance the biological fa-
ther's interests with those of the other parties in the family. Id. at 465-66. The California
court stated that "[tihe mother and her husband have, like Michael [the putative father], done
everything in their power to establish a stable traditional family unit." Id. at 465. The court
recognized that its consideration of the putative father's challenge to the statutory scheme that
denied him standing "does not occur in a vacuum." Id. The court asserted that it "must
balance his acknowledged due process interest . . . against the countervailing interests of...
[the mother and her new husband], and those of the state, in preserving family integrity." Id.
at 465-66.
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C. The Burden To Register Must Be On The Putative Fathers
State legislatures that endeavor to create and adopt putative fathers' regis-
tries will achieve the necessary balance between the competing interests in
adoption proceedings. Through the registry, the state will be able to effi-
ciently and definitively protect the putative father's right without involving
the courts.28° The burden to register must lie with the putative father, how-
ever, thereby removing the responsibility of notification from the adoption
agency and respecting valid public policy that rejects the imposition of liabil-
ity on the adoption agencies in most cases.281 Additionally, the registry
shields adoptive families from the threat that the adoption will be jeopard-
ized at a later date.2" 2 Finally, adopted children will be given the opportu-
nity to live in a stable environment, thereby satisfying the best interests of
the child standard.28 3
D. Publicity
In order for a putative fathers' registry to be successful, its availability
must be publicized. Some of the states that have registries provide for fund-
ing and statewide distribution of information as to the registry's existence, its
purpose, procedures on how to register, and most importantly, the conse-
284quences of failure to register. Although lack of knowledge of the registry
280. See supra notes 270-75 and accompanying text (discussing the registry's enforcement).
281. See supra notes 241-54 and accompanying text (discussing public policies).
282. See supra notes 270-75 (discussing the effect of a strictly construed registry
requirement).
283. The currently unsettled procedures in contested adoptions have detrimental effects on
the children involved. See, e.g., DeBoer v. DeBoer, Nos. A-64, A-65, 1993 U.S. LEXIS 4665,
*1 (July 30, 1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun's dissent emphasized the emo-
tion aspects of adoption cases gone awry when he stated:
This is a case that touches the raw nerves of life's relationships. We have before us,
in Jessica, a child of tender years who for her entire life has been nurtured by the
DeBoers, a loving couple led to believe through the adoption process and the then-
single biological mother's consent, that Jessica was theirs. Now, the biological father
appears, marries the mother, and claims parental status towards Jessica.
Id. See also In re M.N.M., 605 A.2d 921, 934 (D.C.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 636 (1992). The
M.N.M. court, reflecting on the result of the remand of the H.R. case, noted that the child
" 'became anxious and bewildered' " when it became clear that his environment was
threatened. Id. (citing In re Petition to Adopt Baby Boy C., No. A-249-83, Memorandum
Opinion and Judgment (D.C. Super. Ct. Jan. 3, 1992)). The child asked "'I'll always stay in
this family won't I, even if I meet my father, my natural father?' " Id. The child " 'developed
a nervous tic in his eye,'" and felt "'he was in the [adoptive] home on a provisional basis.' "
Id. The court noted that the child " 'picked up the anxiety of [the adoptive parents] notwith-
standing their best efforts to shield him from their feelings of being threatened by [the natural
father's] action .... Unavoidably, this case is causing [the child] stress and emotional pain.'
Id.
284. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 55.1(G)(1-2) (1987) (providing that the Depart-
ment of Human Services shall establish a centralized paternity registry, make forms available
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is not a valid defense to a putative father's failure to register, extensive pub-
licity of a newly created registry would be appropriate to educate putative
fathers about the registry and its function.285
V. CONCLUSION
The nature of the family and the protection to which it is entitled has
changed dramatically in the past decades.28 6 Great deference remains with
the states in the area of parent-child relations, 2 7 thus, the responsibility re-
mains with the states to establish appropriate means to protect all members
of the modem family. In light of the fact that the current adoption situation
at the state court level is one of uncertainty, and the status of many potential
adoptions is at risk, the dilemma is ripe for remedy. Until the rights and
responsibilities of putative fathers are effectively addressed, the institution of
adoption will continue to slide into jeopardy as a viable parenting option.
Alexandra R. Dapolito
to any putative father, and provide for the publication and statewide distribution of informa-
tion as to the existence of the registry, the procedures for entry, and the consequences of the
failure to register).
285. Fathers' Rights, supra note 4, at 3.
286. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 256 (1983). The Lehr Court stated that the "intan-
gible fibers that connect parent and child have infinite variety. They are woven throughout the
fabric of our society, providing it with strength, beauty, and flexibility. It is self-evident that
they are sufficiently vital to merit constitutional protection in appropriate cases.")
287. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 256 (holding that in the vast majority of cases involving the legal
problems arising from the parent-child relationship, state law determines the final outcome).
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